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Executive Summary 
The purpose of my study is to understand the presence and nature of barriers that prevent 
SMEs entering into and/or trading successfully in the rail sector, or that slow their rate of 
progress in penetrating this market. The corollary to this is to understand why the upper 
reaches of the sector, the buying and commissioning community (including government), 
are so poor at managing and developing their suppliers and benefiting from their inherent 
vibrancy. The supply chain in terms of qualified suppliers has remained static for over 5 
years and within this total the proportion of SMEs has also remained substantially 
unchanged. 
My hypothesis is that the current difficulties in the supply chain are a direct result of the 
fragmentation caused by the breaking up of the railway at the time of privatisation in 1992. 
Until such time as the railway sector has found a way of creating a coherent and conscious 
ecosystem, its ability to improve its performance will remain inadequate. Additionally, I 
address the hypothesis that, effectively, a major barrier to entry for SMEs is the inadequate 
provision of testing and evaluation facilities. 
My research has established that the consequences of fragmentation remain the primary 
barrier and that this has fed an inclination towards exclusion and actions that amount to 
anti-competitive behaviour. The testing and trialling provision is thus but a small part of a 
wider malaise.  
Based on my research I recommend that further work be done to align collective and 
individual objectives in the rail sector such that the inherent structural weaknesses can be 
overcome through the application of a challenge-based approach such as Formula Rail. An 
important consequence of this would be to address the background political imperatives 
behind the privatisation of the sector, to adapt the structures in the light of a changing 
environment and to diminish the tactical interventions of governments by clarifying their 
overarching strategic role.  
The author conceived the term Formula Rail as a label for a forward looking approach to 
creating a virtually integrated railway. The Formula Rail process starts by re-interpreting 
the requirements of one or several stakeholders and creates an agreed problem statement 
that allows all parties to contribute fully to achieving a timely, economic and acceptable 
solution. The process is cognisant of the nuances of the sector, its current challenges, future 
ambitions and multiple ecosystems, of the fact that the very environment and its ‘rules’ are 
subject to change and re-interpretation by politicians, officials and a wide variety of other 
players. 
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1 Introduction 
The rail sector in the UK, as in many countries around the globe, is enjoying record levels of 
investment across a broad range of its assets and activities. There is a widespread recognition 
that its supplier base needs to expand to meet both the needs of this growth and those of the 
UK government’s Industrial Strategy, aimed at building a stronger, diversified economy. The 
railway needs to improve its ability to adopt emerging as well as existing technology from 
other sectors. In short, the railway in the UK remains a very challenging place to do business. 
The Rail Value for Money study team’s report Realising the Potential of GB Rail, published in 
May 2011, was the most comprehensive examination of the post-privatisation railway that 
has been conducted to date (DfT/ORR, 2011a). It was widely consulted and drew on the 
resources of a number of the major consultancies. This study resulted in a number of key 
changes to the way in which the sector behaves and how it is organised, e.g., the formation 
of the Rail Delivery Group (RDG). However, it failed to address and analyse fully the wider 
value for money that could accrue from a vibrant, strong and coherent supply chain. Instead 
it seemed too readily to accept the view that the supply chain was well served by existing 
organisational structures, save for the area of the development and support of innovation: 
Innovation is stymied by adversarial, procurement-driven relationships and a 
lack of clear accountability. When impasses are reached, horse-trading rather 
than leadership is the rule. Stakeholders recognise that some innovation 
happens despite these factors and instances of success have relied in the past 
on strong personal relationships. Time and again, misalignment of commercial 
drivers is cited as reason that whole-system value is not sought. (DfT/ORR, 
2011b, p 6) 
In the aftermath of the publication of the report there was a widely held view that there had 
been a watering down, by the Department for Transport (DfT), of some of the study’s 
conclusions and that this could account for the absence of any meaningful recommendations 
about the supply chain itself (Wolmar, 2011). 
In most industrial sectors, small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in the UK that is to say 
companies with less than 250 employees (House of Commons Library, 2017), particularly mid-
market businesses, i.e., companies employing 50 to 249 people, are recognised as significant 
contributors to the economic resurgence of the UK (SME Growth Watch, 2017). In fact, since 
2015, this part of the UK economy has, in terms of revenue generated, significantly 
outperformed its counterparts in Germany’s Mittelstand, the cohort of businesses often held 
up as the engine room of Europe’s biggest economy (Dakers, 2016). In the UK, SMEs represent 
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99% of all businesses, 60% of employment and 51% of turnover (House of Commons Library, 
2017). 
Currently, according to the data held by the Railway Industry Supplier Qualification Scheme 
(RISQS), there are approximately 4300 UK qualified businesses supplying the rail sector and, 
given the high level of investment in the existing rail network and the development of a new 
high-speed infrastructure, there are opportunities for many more companies to join the 
market in all areas of activity; and yet this total figure and the proportion of SMEs (upwards 
of 80% at any given time) within it have remained static for over 5 years (Achilles, 2017).  
This study exposes system failings that run through the sector and my aim is to produce a 
piece of work that will create a new perspective and provide a platform for a better 
understanding of the challenges faced by SMEs and mid-market businesses. Allied to this is 
an evaluation of whether there is any evidence to suggest that the buoyancy of mid-market 
companies in the UK economy generally is reflected in the rail sector and the impact if this is 
not the case. 
My hypothesis is that the current difficulties in the supply chain are a direct result of the 
fragmentation caused by the breakup of the railway industry at privatisation in 1992 and that, 
until such time as the railway sector has found a way of creating a coherent ecosystem, its 
ability to improve its performance will remain sub-optimal and inadequate. 
Additionally, in the context of the Rail Value for Money Study, I address the subsidiary 
hypothesis that, effectively, ‘a major barrier to entry for SMEs is the insufficient provision of 
testing and evaluation facilities’. 
This study has also been influenced by the Rail Supply Group’s (RSG) Fast Track to the Future 
published in February 2016, the Rail Technical Strategies (RTS) published in 2007 (Railway 
Safety and Standards Board – RSSB, 2007) and 2012 (RSSB, 2012) and the Network Rail 
Technical Strategy (NRTS) for 2013, which are widely accepted as the blueprints for the 
evolution of the GB’s requirements for its railways and their capability over the next 30 years, 
covering technologies as well as operational approaches. Subsequent to this, the RTS 
Capability Delivery Plan (CDP) was published in February 2017 (RSSB, 2017b) and identifies 
twelve whole-system ‘key capabilities’ that the railway needs to develop in order to meet the 
challenges of increasing capacity, enhancing customer satisfaction, decreasing cost and 
reducing carbon. 
The overall landscape is made more complicated by the almost total absence of indigenous 
original equipment manufacturers (OEM)/Tier 1 businesses in some areas of the industry, for 
example, in traction and rolling stock production. To be factored in is the as-yet unknown 
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impact of Brexit. The fulfilment of the sector’s vision thus relies heavily on the ability of 
indigenous SMEs and also larger enterprises to court the attention of foreign-owned 
multinational companies, with potentially ever more limited GB-specific agendas of their own 
as they operate both within and outside of the GB. 
The government has recently published a Green Paper entitled Building our Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS, 2017). A cornerstone to its proposals is the development of Sector Deals which 
in themselves are based on a sector’s ability to identify a course of action that will see step 
changes in productivity and utility, etc. The House of Commons Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS) Committee Industrial Strategy: First Review published in February 2017 
expresses some concern at this approach and has highlighted weaknesses in the approach by 
stating: 
“sectoral policies appear to have worked well for the automotive and 
aerospace industries. However with regards to other sectors this approach 
had, at best, mixed results. Furthermore, this approach appears to have the 
greatest risk of policy being built on the vested interests of big businesses and 
incumbents that are best equipped to lobby … There is a risk that a sectoral 
approach encourages business to maintain rather than break down silos, and 
leads to policies designed to suit preferred industries at the expense of other 
sectors and the wider public interest.” (House of Commons BEIS Committee, 
2017, para. 54) 
A sector deal for rail could ultimately have a positive impact on the indigenous supply chain. 
Although, after the launch of the strategy in February 2016, the RSG lost all momentum, it is 
now starting to perform more coherently and its response to the call from the government to 
develop a sector deal is heartening; however, the concerns of the select committee, stated 
above, should resonate. The move to align the RSG with the RDG is most welcome and will 
provide a level of horizontal integration not seen since privatisation. 
This study is based on my experience as a senior military logistics officer who, in the course 
of his duties, was fortunate enough to have been given the opportunity to realign the railway 
elements of the UK’s defence capability. This proved to be a microcosm of the national system 
and faced many of the same challenges, driven by similar political imperatives. Since leaving 
the Army I have run successful businesses in the sector and also formed and developed the 
Rail Alliance, which has grown to become the sector’s leading business to business networking 
organisation. Both of these roles have given me a unique opportunity to examine the GB rail 
sector. I have routine access to senior politicians through their Departmental teams and I am 
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also fortunate enough to be a full member of the Railway Supply Group (RSG) Council and a 
number of its subsidiary management boards, such as the Innovation Leadership Group and 
the Export Leadership Group. My motivation for this particular study is to challenge the sector 
to strive for excellence and to perform to its true potential. 
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2 Background and Today’s Scene 
2.1 Background 
Any meaningful observation and analysis of the GB rail sector’s supply chain needs to take 
into account the position of the railway industry in the overall industrial landscape of the 
country in the 21st century. The factors specific to the sector will be examined later in this 
chapter; however, there are some more generic aspects that help place this all in context. 
The UK, like many countries around the world, is very reliant on SMEs to power its economy. 
It is generally accepted that this tier of the economy accounts for >99% of all businesses, 
employs 15.7m people and generates a £1.8t turnover. The economy as a whole employs 
26.2m people and turns over £3.86t (BEIS, 2016). SMEs can thus be said to provide almost 
50% of the UK’s industrial activity. 
 
Figure 1 – Railway Supply Chain's Contribution to the UK Economy (RSG, 2016) 
According to the RSG’s strategy document Fast Track for Growth (RSG, 2015) the GB rail sector 
employs some 124,000 people and accounts for £7bn in turnover. However, to set the rail 
sector in a national context, this represents 0.473% of the working population and 0.002% of 
turnover. 
It is also an accepted mantra that the SME is the home of innovation, although there are 
perhaps more complex reasons for this, other than some form of innate ability that only 
appears within this type of company. 
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Given that the railway industry accounts for such a small percentage of overall turnover, the 
picture of a supply chain populated by companies that consider rail as a small, although 
important, part of their overall trading starts to become clearer. Work that I conducted in 
2014/15 for the then Enabling Innovation Team (EIT) showed that approximately 95% of the 
railway supply chain was made up of companies that do not consider themselves to be rail 
suppliers (RSSB, 2015b). More recent work conducted by ComRes, on behalf of RSG, broadly 
validates this percentage at in excess of 75% (ComRes, 2017). Therefore there are issues that 
will act as barriers to entry to the sector that are in fact generic by nature; that is to say they 
reflect the difficulties that any ‘non-specialist’ has when trying to enter a specialised and, in 
this case, highly conservative and risk-averse market. As a generic indication of the scale of 
diversity, Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) have identified that their Relationship Managers in, for 
example, Healthcare or Construction each look after market sectors that are defined by 
between 120 and 150 standard industrial classification (SIC)-coded elements (LBG, 2017). The 
manufacturing sector has in excess of 8000 SIC codes and hidden within this pool are the mass 
of railway suppliers, both in terms of rolling stock and infrastructure equipment. 
The perspective of this report is that of the SME and how such organisations can be involved 
in the GB rail industry and, indeed, how they can play a significant part in enabling the industry 
to meet its many challenges. Thus I believe that it is important to outline some simple ‘truths’, 
which can help to define SMEs. It is the general experience of the SME in its dealings with the 
corporate world, including that of government and its many agents, that it is regarded as a 
corporate in miniature. In reality, the SME has no such pretensions nor does it need to. The 
following points draw extensively on the EIT work mentioned above: 
• Firstly, the SME is a very different animal, in almost all characteristics, from the 
corporate business and is driven by completely different objectives. It will generally be 
more entrepreneurial, more flexible and more fixated on the company’s long-term 
growth and health although, crucially, it is more vulnerable in the short term. In other 
words: jam tomorrow = no cash today = no future; 
• The Secretary of State for Transport has described the railway sector as disjointed 
(Grayling, 2017), and thus almost by design, its default setting is towards the adversarial 
end of the spectrum. In transactional analysis terms it seldom gets better than a 
‘parent–child’ relationship. This discourages trusting, collaborative relationships and 
inevitably leads to the SME seeking business in other sectors. The SME thrives on trust 
because high-trust relationships mean that business is transacted more quickly and the 
relationship is more responsive to innovation; 
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• The position of the SME in the railway sector supply chain is precarious. The almost total 
absence of indigenous OEMs means that the route to market is most often in 
competition with overseas players, better supported by intra-national structures and 
‘closed’ local supply chains. The SME does not usually have the depth of resource to 
conduct long-term, open-ended campaigns; it will typically have just one or two people 
looking after business development; 
• The majority of SME suppliers to the sector do not supply whole solutions; they are in 
the main providing goods and services at subsystem or component level. By contrast, 
the generic procurement processes are very much system-based and biased towards 
the corporate style of compliance. They are therefore very often beyond both the reach 
and understanding of the SMEs who simply do not have the knowledge, manpower 
(resources) or time to comply.  
• Innovation is in the DNA of most SMEs and entrepreneurs. It does not need stimulating 
specifically. What it does require is some form of encouragement and nourishment, 
mainly in terms of a clear or at least identified route to market. 
• In my experience as a first generation SME owner they are entrepreneurs and therefore 
risk-takers. They will challenge and seek passage around obstacles. It is generally their 
money in the game and therefore they will be very conscious of the consequences of 
their actions. Doing nothing is rarely an option. By contrast, the corporate world is 
typified by risk aversion and the pursuit of stability – do nothing is always an option! 
• SMEs understand collaboration – they usually hunt in packs. 
• Finally, the extremely risk-averse nature of the rail sector and the obsession of the 
higher tiers with passing risk down the supply chain are not conducive to building high-
trust, collaborative relationships. 
In essence penetrating the GB rail market requires a level of detailed sector knowledge that 
few SMEs have or are able to obtain. The rail supply chain is dominated by a limited number 
of OEMs, Tier 1s and their near-monopoly customers, e.g., London Underground and Network 
Rail (NR). The vast majority of players in the supply chain are not rail companies and would 
not describe themselves as such. This is recognised in the Future Railway report SMEs and the 
Rail Industry: Creating a Chain Reaction (RSSB, 2015b). It is therefore a much disaggregated 
and confusing sector. Good market intelligence on which to base business case development 
is vital. The default setting of the SME is to identify and exploit niches but it can only do this 
with accurate, contemporary and detailed market intelligence data. The diagram below draws 
these threads together in the context of collaboration (See Figure 2): 
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2.2 The Four Pillars 
 
The Sector, in the opinion of the RSG, considers that there are the following four primary 
challenges (RSG, 2016): 
2.2.1 Market Conditions 
SMEs do not have a clear view of market conditions. This is typified by: 
• Limited collaboration between customers, OEMs, Tier 1/2 suppliers and SMEs; 
• Customers often wield extreme purchasing power; 
• ‘Single voice’ leadership in the industry could be stronger; 
• Uncertainty: limited forward visibility of demand; 
• Peaks and troughs in demand and a lack of collaborative procurement strategies; 
SME
A very different 
animal
System 
Subsystem or 
component 
supply
Thrives on 
adult-adult high 
trust 
relationships
Entrepreneurs 
and risk takers
Limited 
Business 
Development 
capacity
Innovation in 
their DNA
Good at 
exploiting niche 
markets
They hunt in 
packs
Figure 2 – Collaboration in SMEs 
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• Barriers associated with being aware of company standards, understanding needs and 
addressing product approval. 
2.2.2 Innovation 
SMEs’ natural instinct to innovate is stymied by: 
• Limited investment in GB rail research and development (R&D); 
• Time-consuming product approval process; 
• Risk aversion in bringing innovations to market; 
• High barriers to entry into existing and new markets; 
• The way in which GB simulation, validation and testing resources are structured and 
promoted rendering them invisible and inaccessible to many.  
2.2.3 People and Skills 
SMEs are affected by the wider human resource issues experienced in today’s railway 
industry, namely: 
• Growing skills gap and growing demands; 
• Ageing workforce and changing skills requirements; 
• Difficulties in attracting talent and poor gender diversity; 
• Limited training resources and shortage of trainers and lecturers; 
• Uncoordinated range of skills initiatives fragmenting effort; 
• Lack of a joined-up approach across subsectors. 
2.2.4 Exports and Inward Investment 
SMEs in the UK are generally good at identifying markets for their products and services but 
barriers are typified by: 
• High-value consultancy activity is not being leveraged for the benefit of UK supply 
companies; 
• Investment decisions by large suppliers may not be made in the UK; 
• Lack of UK-based turnkey supply offerings to overseas customers; 
• Poor-quality industry data. 
Many if not all of these are actually generic difficulties, common to many sectors, but are no 
less important for that. However, in this thesis they will not be addressed separately, so as to 
not to detract from the overall aim of focusing on what is important to the railway. 
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It is also important to define at this point what the term ‘rail industry’ actually encompasses. 
I would maintain that it is common parlance to talk in terms of a railway industry when, in 
reality, no such entity exists. There are individual companies and there are groups of 
companies. They vary in their individuality and some ‘families’ are much bigger and more 
extended than others. However, it is a meaningless and redundant term when used in its 
current sense. I would argue that it is an ill-defined attempt to encompass any and/or all 
activity related to the rail sector, as a means of creating the appearance of volume and 
significance when, in fact, neither exists nor passes detailed scrutiny. 
This perhaps arcane point is important because any serious observation of the sector very 
quickly becomes mired in attempting to understand a set of related and interdependent 
ecosystems, as opposed to a single entity (i.e., an industry). To some extent, this can be 
explained by the technical, operational and organisational characteristics of the rail mode of 
transport which result in a complex and complicated system of systems (Kemp, Camm, Evans, 
& Elphick, 2013; Schmid, 2010). 
There are many ways in which the railway could be viewed but to attempt to group any and 
every activity that happens to benefit from the interface between metal wheels and metal 
rails is disingenuous. It can be argued that, had the railway not been de-nationalised in 1993, 
it might have been possible to create an effective whole-system view although I would 
suggest, given the diversity in the supply chain, such a notion would still be fundamentally 
flawed. Yet, it is a view that persists, even though the supplier base of the railway was already 
diversified and fragmented at the time of privatisation. 
At one level the railway is viewed by its paymasters, the taxpayer, as a single entity and, in 
the foreword to her recent report, Nicola Shaw describes it as such: 
“Part of the country’s collective psyche, the railway is important for economic 
and social development, requires substantial public investment, carries us 
around – daily for some, on occasion for others – has significant impacts on 
our built environment and landscape, and is, mostly, photogenic. These things, 
together with the colourful characters who have worked on, designed, 
managed and regulated the system, mean that rail is regularly featured in the 
British media and discussed around kitchen tables, on social media, and in 
Parliament”. (DfT, 2015b, p 4) 
That the railway is a complex, interdependent system of systems (Kemp et al., 2013) is not in 
question, but it is not an industry. The generic term industry is generally taken to mean ‘the 
economic activity concerned with the processing of raw materials and manufacture of goods 
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in factories’ (OED, 2017). The main output of the railway sector is the transport of passengers 
and goods from B to C. A relatively small subset is the manufacture of goods to support that 
activity (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3 – Diagrammatic View of the Rail Sector (courtesy B. Eickhoff and F. Schmid) 
Conversely, as we will see below, the automotive industry manufactures automobiles and the 
aerospace industry manufactures aircraft. 
To put this in context, in the Automotive Council’s overview of their sector (Automotive 
Council (2013)), it states that the UK automotive industry is very diverse and, paraphrasing, it 
reports that there are more than 40 companies manufacturing cars in the UK, in some of 
Europe’s most productive plants. These include 11 of the world’s global vehicle and engine 
manufacturers – Aston Martin, BMW (MINI and Rolls Royce), Ford, General Motors (Vauxhall), 
Honda, Jaguar Land Rover, Lotus, MG, Nissan, Toyota and Volkswagen (Bentley) –- as well as 
specialist brands, such as McLaren and Morgan, and Triumph motorcycles (Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013, p. 11). The presence of strong premium and niche 
vehicle producers in the UK means that the UK is second in the world to Germany for premium 
vehicles. There are also major manufacturers of commercial vehicles in the UK, including 
Leyland Trucks, Dennis Eagle, Wright Bus, Optare and Alexander Dennis, as well as 
construction, agriculture and other specialist equipment makers like Case New Holland, 
Caterpillar, JCB, Komatsu, Perkins, Terex and Thwaites. By inference, the automotive industry 
does not include highways, traffic control, driving standards, service stations, etc. (see Figure 
4). 
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Figure 4 – Diagrammatic View of the Automotive Sector (courtesy B. Eickhoff and F. Schmid) 
The aerospace industry, which has as its representative council the Aerospace Growth 
Partnership, describes its sector as “everything from business jets to the very largest twin 
aisle passenger aircraft and helicopters to advanced turbo props”; at no point does it attempt 
to widen its scope to include airports, passenger handling, ticketing and airspace control etc. 
(see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 – Diagrammatic View of the Aerospace Sector (courtesy B. Eickhoff and F. Schmid) 
Later in this thesis I will examine why the GB rail sector is in its present form and from that I 
shall draw conclusions about its health and openness to trading. However, at the present 
stage, I am now simply stating that the term ‘railway industry’ has no objective meaning and 
that I will henceforth refer to it as the ‘rail sector’, which I describe as the ‘economic, social 
and cultural activity associated with the operation of the heavy and light rail network’. For 
the purposes of this paper I will further narrow this definition to mean the activity associated 
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directly with the operation of rail vehicles, their systems and rail-specific infrastructure, i.e., 
track, signalling, stations and associated structures, such as tunnels, bridges, etc. 
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3 Privatisation of the Railway and the Law of Unintended 
Consequences 
The GB rail sector today has been framed by the decision of politicians in the late 1980s to 
break up and privatise what was then known as British Rail (BR). The Thatcher governments 
post-1979 were very focused on their commitments to privatisation and deregulation, with a 
primary ethos that removing barriers to competition would lead to free markets that in 
themselves would automatically encourage efficiency and increased levels of productivity. 
Along the way the political value of creating a new class of share-owning public had the 
perceived advantage of consolidating the Conservative vote. 
It is worth noting that although the move to remove the railways from public ownership was 
not the government’s first priority (buses, telecommunications, gas, water and electricity had 
already happened), it is easy to forget that the railway system in this country was founded 
and developed through active competition between companies and that seeking private 
profit has been fundamental throughout its existence (Glaister, 2004). For a variety of political 
reasons (as opposed to economic arguments), over the intervening years governments of all 
political parties have felt uncomfortable with this position and have intervened incessantly in 
the ‘public interest’, with debatable efficiency and effect. The modern history of the railway 
in particular is littered with such interventions, which merely serve to further confuse an 
already obfuscated market place and do little to build confidence. 
Some 5 years prior to the act of privatisation the House of Commons Transport Select 
Committee concluded that: 
The fundamental objective of advocates of privatisation is to free the 
nationalised industries from bureaucracy and political intervention and to 
replace these forces with the disciplines of the market, in the expectation that 
this will lead to greater efficiency, lower unit costs and a better allocation of 
resources. The corollary of this, usually welcomed by management, is that the 
enterprises are freed from constraints on investment and on funding imposed 
as part of public expenditure controls. It is also argued that the very process 
of privatisation forces consideration of all the rights, duties and constraints 
affecting an enterprise, which is the basis for a far better identification of 
social objectives and their means of achievement than the historic process of 
control of nationalist industries. Opponents of privatisation argue that it is 
primarily a convenient way of abandoning the traditional social duties of the 
public enterprises, and of renegotiating, to the disadvantage of employees, 
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their terms of employment. (House of Commons Transport Committee, 1987, 
para. 232) 
As the White Paper expected in late 1991 was postponed until after the 1992 General Election 
the first real indication of the government’s intentions came in the Conservative party 
manifesto: 
We believe that the best way to produce profound and lasting improvements 
on the railways is to end BR's state monopoly. We want to restore the pride 
and local commitment that died with nationalisation. We want to give the 
private sector the opportunity to operate existing rail services and introduce 
new ones, for both passengers and freight. 
A significant number of companies have already said that they want to 
introduce new railway services as soon as the monopoly is ended. We will give 
them that chance. 
Our plans for the railways are designed to bring better services for all 
passengers as rapidly as possible. We believe that franchising provides the 
best way of achieving that. Long term, as performance improves and services 
become more commercially attractive as a result of bringing in private sector 
disciplines, it will make sense to consider whether some services can be sold 
outright. (Conservative Party, 1992, p. 35) 
It is clear that in terms of previous international railways experience, the form 
of privatisation adopted by the UK Government is both novel and 
experimental (in the sense of being untested). It is true that some elements of 
the Government's proposals have been put into practice or contemplated in 
various parts of the world. Yet in no country with a rail system of comparable 
size and density of use is there an example, either in operation or even under 
consideration, of a complete scheme such as that contained in the Railways 
Bill. This does not of itself mean that it cannot succeed. To take that argument 
to its logical conclusion would mean that no innovation ever took place. What 
it does mean, however, is that because of the lack of previous experience to 
draw upon, the risk that something could go badly wrong is that much higher. 
To put it another way, the system of railway operation proposed by the 
Government probably can work, but, in the words of one witness, it may need 
to be made to work. 
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The onus lies firmly on the Government to demonstrate that its plans will 
provide a better service to the travelling public. If all the Government's 
assumptions are correct about such matter as: 
• the prospects for investment; 
• the practicality of the relationship between Railtrack and operating 
companies; 
• the response of the private sector to the new opportunities on offer; and 
• the feasibility of combining open access with franchising. 
then there may be the potential for an improved railway system. Whether the 
Government is right in these assumptions is a matter of political judgement. 
The final verdict will rest with rail users. (House of Commons Transport 
Committee, 1993, paras. 523 and 524) 
Yet many, including senior people within the Conservative party, believed that privatisation 
was merely a mechanism to manage the railway’s gradual decline without too heavy a burden 
on the taxpayer (Calder, 2016). It is a highly debatable point as to whether the manifesto and 
consequent White Paper aims have been realised across the intervening 25 years and to note 
the accuracy of the Transport Select Committee’s commentary. 
This course of action was therefore in no small part based predominantly on the 
understanding that the sector was in terminal decline and the organisation formed to take 
the infrastructure forward (Railtrack) was designed to manage that process. If it was to have 
a future then that had to come from the application of free market forces and the benefit of 
real competition. 
The free market was to be left to manage the major routes and very little public money was 
to be available for the purchase of new traction or rolling stock. 
It is fair to note that since privatisation the railways in Britain are carrying 92% more 
passengers, more safely and on a newer fleet of trains (DfT, 2013, p. 5). However, there is also 
a fair case to be made that, given the real cost to the taxpayer across the same period, this 
would have happened anyway, or at least that alternative instruments may have been 
engaged to achieve the same end. There is little or no evidence to suggest that the indigenous 
supply chain supporting the sector has seen any similar level of growth or benefit. A simple 
measure would be to look at the membership of the railway supply chain’s own trade 
association, the Railway Industry Association, across this same period. It could be said that 
this is a useful barometer of the part of the supply chain that specialises in rail. In broad 
numerical terms it is slightly larger today; however when companies registered in the UK but 
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parented abroad are removed from the membership, the number of companies of significant 
size remaining which are genuinely indigenous shows a picture of significant decline. 
Concomitant with this political doctrine, the European Union in its First Railway Package (EU 
Directive 91/440/EC) had recognised that the existing structures within the community’s 
railways were not particularly conducive to the development of a free and open market and 
thus this and subsequent legislation sought to increase competition through separation of the 
operation of rail services from the provision of infrastructure (the removal of so-called 
horizontal and vertical integration). This did not in itself mean that state railways had to be 
privatised and, in fact, the UK government was the only member state to interpret the rules 
in this fashion and act accordingly. 
Based on the managed decline premise (Mathieu, 2003), the process was conducted at pace 
and thus began a period of change and instability that was to last until the present day. 
Although there is a level of stability in the current system it could not by any measure be said 
to be in a steady state. In its comprehensive Britain’s Railway Crisis the University of Bath 
Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries (CRI) eloquently described the railway as it was 
in 2004, some 10 years after privatisation; many of the failings discussed are still true today. 
Notable are the key challenges posed by “excessive fragmentation and the industry’s 
interface complexities”, combined with the “problems of political, governmental and 
regulatory management of the large public subsidy” (Bartle, 2004, p. 1). 
The CRI study concluded that there are four aspects which make the sector different to others, 
and that it has certain characteristics that make it stand out amongst the utility industries and 
even different transport modes: 
First, and perhaps the most well-known, is that it is an inherently loss-making 
industry dependent on government subsidy, and unlike coal and steel, for 
example, the supply of rail services cannot be imported, and the British rail 
industry must be kept in business (although individual companies could be 
allowed to go bankrupt and taken over by others). (Bartle, 2004, p. 4) 
Although estimates vary between £9bn and £14bn (The Hendy Review, 2015), the value to 
the UK economy of the output of the railway is considerable with annual movement of 1.65b 
passengers and 503.2m tonnes of freight, hence the value to the taxpayer of keeping a “loss-
making” sector in business is self-evident (RSSB, 2017b, p. 6). This critical national output 
value should be considered a key factor when considering the railway’s response to the Sector 
Deal programme covered later in this work (BEIS, 2017). 
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Secondly, the rail industry is constrained by highly complex interfaces, a result, 
in part, of the 170 year legacy of its infrastructure. Significant upgrades, such 
as new rolling stock or lines, cannot be installed and operated with clearly 
discrete and limited interfaces; new trains, for example, must be compatible 
with the tracks, bridges and tunnels, signalling systems and station platforms, 
most of which were built at different times with different interfacing 
requirements. (Bartle, 2004, p. 4) 
Layered onto these complex interfaces is the safety-critical nature of mass public transport. 
Thirdly, there are significant network capacity limitations which have become 
increasingly evident during the 1990s as a result of the substantial increase in 
user demand. While other network industries have network problems, none 
has had its performance compromised by its capacity in similar ways. (Bartle, 
2004, p. 4) 
One of the key values of the new European Rail Traffic Management System is to try and 
overcome the severe limitations imposed on increased scale of operations by the lack of 
available infrastructure. No other mode of modern transport is so confined in this way and, 
of all of the European nations, the UK is the most constrained, thereby presenting it with both 
a unique challenge and an opportunity.  
Fourthly, the rail industry in Britain is also severely constrained by the scarcity of land 
particularly in densely populated areas of England which also have a high demand for 
services. This is a serious constraint if the network capacity problems are to be 
addressed by network expansion. It is much more difficult to develop new lines (such 
as high-speed inter-city lines) in England than in countries such as France and Germany 
which are much less densely populated, and new lines on green field sites are more 
easily achieved. (Bartle, 2004, p. 4) 
This fourth aspect is compounded by emerging EU noise level legislation. As population 
density increases it is ever harder for the railway to achieve new routes that are deemed 
socially acceptable. The recent grant of Royal Assent to the HS2 Hybrid Bill took 3 years of 
negotiation, parliamentary hearings for 1600 of the 2588 objections and an eleventh-hour bid 
in the House of Lords to defeat the scheme, and the cost of the project to date is circa £1.4bn 
(Plimmer, 2017). It is clear that the level of complexity and cost involved in creating new lines 
on a congested island means that only ‘mega’ infrastructure projects are likely even to get off 
the starting blocks. 
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3.1 Conclusions 
It seems clear that the primary objective of the process to privatise the GB railway system 
was to significantly reduce the level of public expenditure in a system that was assumed to 
be in long-term, and possibly terminal, decline. The assumptions based on privatisation of 
other core national assets such as telecommunications, utilities, etc. proved to be false in the 
case of the railway sector, and thus the unintended consequence was that an entirely artificial 
oligopolistic marketplace was constructed, in a manner unique to the GB. Such markets are 
characterised by dominance of a relatively small number of powerful players/actors. The 
ability to ‘game’ the market (badly in the case of government departments or well in the case 
of franchise operators) is distinct and the inevitable outcome is reduced competition, poor 
market behaviour and extreme, short-term protectionist (exclusive) behaviours. These 
characteristics, combined with the inability of government departments to manage complex 
interdependencies and provide clear, unambiguous and consistent leadership, have created 
a complex business landscape for the supply chain to navigate. 
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4 The McNulty Study as a Baseline 
The sector today remains a fragmented, complex and disjointed beast. It is nicely summarised 
by Professor John Stittle Professor of Accounting at Essex University in a recent article in the 
Financial Times: 
 “The train you catch is owned by a bank, leased to a private company, which has a 
franchise from the Department for Transport to run it on this track owned by Network Rail, 
all regulated by another office, and all paid for by taxpayers or passengers. The complexity is 
expensive” (Plimmer & Ford, 2018) 
 It survives because it is so vital but it is not in any way a user-friendly place to do business, or 
even to travel. Since privatisation there have been a number of reviews and studies 
commissioned and executed. 
Those related to the aftermath of accidents like Southall, Ladbroke Grove, Hatfield, Great 
Heck and Greyrigg have all contributed significantly to the development of the safe system 
that GB rail enjoys today (ORR, 2016a). For the purposes of this study I have not considered 
such studies any further. 
However, there has been an extensive range of work of some relevance to the supply chain 
over the intervening years. For the sake of clarity and to maintain a contemporaneous 
approach I have worked from a baseline using the Rail Value for Money study which produced 
the Realising the Potential of GB Rail report jointly commissioned by the DfT and the Office 
of Rail Regulation published in 2011. It is worth noting that Sir Roy McNulty leant back on the 
2004 Future of Rail White Paper. 
The report was chosen as it is the most comprehensive examination of the post-privatisation 
railway conducted to date, and as part of its deliberations it made reference back to the 
privatisation process, producing a simple analysis of what lessons could be learned (DfT/ORR, 
2011a, p. 41). It was widely consulted, and drew on the resources of a number of the major 
consultancies. Although it was widely criticised at the time for the way in which, to quote the 
seasoned rail journalist Christian Wolmar, “the process was hijacked by the Department for 
Transport which ultimately stifled debate and ensured that the report’s conclusions 
contradicted its findings” (Wolmar, 2011), it is nonetheless a vast body of research work to 
draw upon. That the final report’s conclusions were clearly ‘managed’ by the DfT does not 
detract from the groundwork of the reports on which these conclusions were based. 
It also had the unusual pedigree in that it was commissioned in February 2010 by Secretary 
of State for Transport Lord Adonis under the Labour administration and then completed its 
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work under the Philip Hammond, his successor in the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition 
government. The report did not lack ambition and thus some of the statements early in its 
final iteration are bold and confident. That it was subsequently diluted rather aligns with the 
comments made previously in the CRI report about the susceptibility of this sector to political 
and departmental interference (Glaister, 2004). The timing of the report’s final publication 
was also probably not helpful to its ultimate integrity. Reports that do well are driven by the 
political imperatives of that moment. 
A contemporary exemplar is the Hauser report which also started life under the auspices of 
the Labour government (Lord Mandelson) and concluded under the Liberal Democrat 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Sir Vince Cable. This work set the scene 
for investment to establish a network of technology and innovation centres (the Catapult 
Centres). Although this spanned the same timeframe as the McNulty review, in stark contrast 
it has gone on to be hugely successful. Part of the difference is that the Catapult process was 
fully aligned politically to the coalition government’s aims and objectives, whereas the 
McNulty review inevitably drew attention to the failures of privatisation and of the 
subsequent franchise processes, both of which are deeply rooted in Conservative politics. 
Secondly, the McNulty review was first envisaged in the post-recession period when the 
assumption was that recovery would be protracted, and therefore dramatic savings would 
need to be found. This did not prove to be the case in terms of rail travel and thus the moment 
passed. Politically, by the time the report was being finished, a whole new set of political 
imperatives were in play and therefore it was cherry-picked by a department that did not 
have a political master committed to any particular agenda other than not rocking the boat. 
Instead, it was followed up by the DfT with its 2012 White Paper which “could be fairly 
represented as McNulty with a political spin” (Bowman et al., 2013, p. 144). 
Later in this thesis I will make some observations about why so few of the review’s 
recommendations were adopted or implemented. I will also review the “important 
prerequisites” that, according to Sir Roy, “need to be in place within any industry or activity 
to make cost reduction actually happen” (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 35); he noted that the study 
showed quite clearly that many of these conditions were missing from the then current 
system and I maintain that little has changed in the intervening years. 
The original terms of reference for the report were as follows: 
1. To examine the overall cost structure of all elements of the railway sector and to 
identify options for improving value for money to passengers and the taxpayer while 
continuing to expand capacity as necessary and drive up passenger satisfaction. 
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2. In particular, to examine: 
• what legal, operational and cultural barriers stand in the way of efficiency 
improvements; 
• the incentives across different parts of the rail industry to generate greater 
efficiency; 
• the role of new technology, processes and working practices in fostering 
greater efficiency; 
• ways of generating more revenue, e.g. car parking, gating at stations, better 
utilisation of property; and 
• to make recommendations. 
3. The Study will examine the whole-industry costs and revenues and their composition. 
In doing so, it will look at comparable industries in the UK and abroad. 
4. The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) will be a joint sponsor of the Study. The ORR will 
remain responsible for delivering efficiency improvements by Network Rail (NR) and for safety 
regulation. The Study should take account of ORR’s benchmarking work for the period 2009–
14 and beyond. 
5. The work will divide into a scoping study and a detailed report, the former to be 
completed by the end of March 2010. 
Although there is no specific mention in the terms of reference of the role that the supply 
chain has to play, I would suggest that this is implicit in the first three bullet points of section 
2 above. The Level One (summary) report of the final document set out the principal findings, 
recommendations and assessment of the potential for reduction in costs based on a template 
drawn up for all elements of the study and including the following ‘prerequisites’ which the 
study team considered needed 
to be in place within any industry or activity to make cost reduction actually 
happen: 
• good leadership from the top; 
• clear objectives and the right values (which focus on costs, but also protect other 
key values such as safety and service quality); 
• good quality, devolved, financial information available to all concerned; 
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• a culture where the status quo and previous assumptions are continually 
challenged; 
• an organisation structure that fosters: − well-motivated management teams; − the 
correct organisational alignment; − whole organisation effort; and − the right speed 
of action; 
• incentives and contractual mechanisms that encourage cost reduction; 
• implementation and focus at every level; 
• effective communications; 
• a focus on detail and making change happen; and 
• consistency of purpose over long periods. (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 35) 
Based on template assessments against the generic prerequisites above, the study team 
identified what it called its “top ten themes” (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 35), a grouping of the 
barriers to efficiency as they were seen at that time. In terms of their relevance to the needs 
and wants of the supply chain I would make the following observations: 
4.1 Fragmentation 
There was a clear recognition that the multiplicity of sector players combined with poorly 
aligned cultures and objectives have created a “co-operation deficit”. It is perhaps not 
surprising that whilst there is a clear need for strong leadership, clarity of purpose and the 
adoption of a strong focus on the right values, the DfT is merely cited as having a role to police 
franchise obligations and little more. In such a fragmented sector the leadership role of the 
department itself must be called into question and examined. 
4.2 The Main Players’ Way of Operating 
Although NR’s complexity, arrogance and detachment from its customers’ needs came in for 
criticism, along with the conflict that train operating companies (TOCs) have with NR and 
passengers whilst pursuing short-term commercial interests (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 36). The 
adversarial nature of relationships between TOCs themselves and then with NR has done little 
to instil collaboration or efficiency in the supply chain. Instead, this adversarial culture flows 
downwards. 
4.3 The Role of Government and Industry 
Due to the highly subsidised nature of the sector there is an inevitable level of interaction 
between the government, through the DfT, and delivery bodies like NR and the TOCs. This of 
course, by extension, reaches into the world of the rolling stock operating companies 
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(ROSCOs) and the OEMs. In this section the study team made the error of referring to 
‘industry’ as if such a thing exists. They then go on to observe that within current frameworks, 
the responsibility for sector performance, especially in relation to cost reduction, has rested 
with government rather than industry, which has failed to take responsibility. The study 
focuses here on NR and the TOCs (industry); however, the role of the wider supply chain and 
its capabilities have been missed out completely. 
4.4 Incentives 
There is little doubt that, outside of the routine cut and thrust of franchise re-tendering, there 
is little evidence to suggest that the picture is any better now than it was when the study 
reported. The issues surrounding alignment of objectives and businesses persist and outside 
of re-franchising there seems little proactive focus on continuous improvements in the pursuit 
of cost reductions. Given the current activities of the Hansford review team, the final 
comment that “there is insufficient contestability for much of NR’s expenditure” is particularly 
telling, as it would seem that little has actually changed in the intervening 6 years. Following 
the announcement at the annual Future of Rail conference in 2016 by NR CEO Mark Carne 
that he would commission an independent review into the barriers to alternative product 
delivery models, the Hansford review, chaired by Professor Peter Hansford (former 
Construction Industry Advisor to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills) of 
University College London, has been set to work. At its heart is their hypothesis 
that greater contestability in the UK rail market would provide more 
opportunity and encourage third parties to invest in and take responsibility for 
delivery of rail infrastructure improvements, which in turn is required for the 
UK rail network to grow and meet future challenges. (Hansford, 2017, p. 7) 
In this setting, contestability is taken to mean the presence of the following characteristics: 
• The threat of competition exists to keep prices low; 
• The barriers to entry and exit should be low; 
• The number of competing companies is not significant. 
At the time of writing, the study had not completed its deliberations. 
4.5 Franchising 
Aside from the more obvious commentary around the barriers imposed by short-term 
franchise periods, over-prescription and inflexibility to react to changing market places, the 
study noted that there was poor usage of residual value mechanisms which in themselves are 
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key to stimulating and encouraging innovative and continuous improvement measures, most 
notably in the domain of rolling stock enhancements to give them a reasonable return on 
investment period. This has been formally addressed since the study but has not had a marked 
effect, probably because it sits in isolation. This links back to the incoherence that epitomises 
the supply chain environment. 
4.6 Fare structures 
From a supply chain perspective the key finding in this area was to once again make the point 
that the sector lags behind other sectors and thus its implementation of SMART technologies 
is poor. These are opportunities lost to the wider supply chain ecosystem. A theme that has 
and will keep recurring in my work is that this inability to embrace change reduces 
competition and opportunity which in itself leads to a declining not growing supply chain 
focused in on itself and acting to exclude new players. 
4.7 Legal and contractual framework 
At the heart of this section are observations that show how the complexity of the system is 
such that it has led to ‘gaming’ of it by some players and the adoption of negative and adverse 
behaviours. All of this has served to erode any sense of esprit de corps carried forward from 
BR and, instead, self-centred adversarial relationships have perpetuated and grown. 
4.8 Supply chain management 
Section 4.8 of the Value for Money study is one of the few places the supply chain gets any 
real mention other than in the context of support to innovation (DfT/ORR, 2011a, pp. 38–39). 
Comments are made about the sector lagging behind others in terms of demand profiles; 
short-term relationships with low levels of collaboration; overly complex relationships 
between franchises, traction and rolling stock purchase; leasing and maintenance; and 
habitually late engagement, the latter four being particularly characteristic of the railway 
sector. The government has recently commissioned a number of reviews into NR alone. The 
two extracts below are from Nicola Shaw and Dame Colette Bowe’s reviews; they also tell a 
consistent story: 
You’ll note already that although I have been asked to report on Network Rail, 
I am setting this in the context of the railway as a whole – that’s because the 
industry has complex interactions between different elements. Over 35,000 
people work for Network Rail, with tens of thousands more working across its 
supply chain and for the train operators who use the rail infrastructure. 
Between these different businesses there are contracts, regulations, codes, 
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committees and licences which govern interactions. These interactions mean 
that changes to Network Rail may have implications elsewhere. (DfT, 2015b, 
p. 4) 
When it came to delivery, costing errors, unanticipated interdependencies, a 
lack of consideration given to deliverability, engineering issues and a poorly 
managed supply chain also contributed. (DfT, 2015a, p. 6) 
In its strategy published in 2016 the RSG also noted the following shortcomings in the sector: 
Market conditions 
• Limited collaboration between clients, Tier 1/2 suppliers and SMEs; 
• ‘Single voice’ leadership in industry could be stronger; 
• Uncertainty: limited forward visibility of demand; 
• Lack of coherent procurement strategy; 
• Barriers associated with company standards, understanding of needs, and 
product acceptance. 
Innovation 
• Limited investment in GB rail R&D; 
• Time consuming product approval process; 
• Risk aversion in bringing innovations to market; 
• High barriers to entry; 
• Insufficient GB simulation, validation and testing capacity.  
The picture has remained much the same between the publication of the Value for Money 
study and the most recent Hansford review. 
4.9 Limitations on whole-system approaches 
A theme that I will develop later in this thesis is that a lack of systems approaches in what is 
a sector dominated by the need for system integrity has had a cripplingly negative effect. The 
study reinforced the view that fragmentation and the behaviours that have been previously 
covered have served to lead players to “optimise their positions within their own silo” 
(DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 39), a characteristic that I will explore in greater depth when I examine 
the culture of exclusion in Chapter 5. 
Breaking down the Barriers – the Participation Puzzle Colin Flack 
The McNulty Study as a Baseline 
 
 
27 
 
4.10 Relationships and Culture 
This part contains within it perhaps the most significant observations of supply chain barriers 
and, although at the conclusion of the chapter the comment is made that “the Study does not 
see this list of barriers as a recipe for despair”, it is clear that the statement was made on the 
assumption that “with strong leadership and concerted effort” they can be overcome 
(DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 40); this may have been somewhat too hopeful. The report highlights the 
unproductive nature of a number of key relationships but crucially in the second part it goes 
on to expand on the “inherited characteristics” of what it calls a “relatively old industry” 
(DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 72). The ecosystem that is a consequence of this culture demonstrates: 
• a lack of openness and transparency; 
• a tendency to be somewhat adversarial; 
• weak capability in terms of partnership; 
• a disinclination to look outside the rail industry for new ideas; and 
• a limited focus on continuous improvement. (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 39) 
These five failings are, I believe, at the heart of what is systemically wrong with the sector and 
until such time as they can all be addressed in a genuine and concerted fashion there will be 
no improvement in the supply chain. I will examine these further in Chapter 5: Why Does the 
Railway So Actively Exclude? 
4.11 Barriers to value for money 
It was interesting that the study settled on adopting the National Audit Office definition that 
“good value for money is the optimal use of resources to achieve the desired outcomes”, not 
least because the team then found that the railway sector structure at that time was very 
difficult to understand and that, stemming on from that, there was little or no clarity on what 
the “desired outcomes” were in reality (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 40). I believe that a fundamental 
issue here was that it appears that there was no attempt to take account of the wider 
economic value of money spent in the sector in terms of value to the indigenous base, in 
other words to grapple with the issues surrounding whole-life cost and subsequent whole-life 
value. From my direct experience in the Ministry of Defence I would estimate that the railway 
sector is at least 15 years behind in its thinking and 20 years behind in its activity (Based on 
the premise that MOD worked with the professional service company KPMG to produce the 
CADMID Cycle of whole life management and costing, in the period 1998-2000 and that 
currently the railway at large is only at about the point the MOD was 2 years into that 
process). 
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In November 2010 the Northern Ireland Procurement Board revised its definition to read 
“best value for money is defined as the most advantageous combination of cost, quality and 
sustainability to meet customer requirements”. Importantly it also went on to be clear that: 
In this context: 
• cost means consideration of whole-life cost; 
• quality means meeting a specification which is fit for purpose and sufficient to 
meet the customer’s requirements; 
• sustainability means economic, social and environmental benefits, considered in 
the business case, in support of the Programme for Government. (Department of 
Finance, no date) 
Had the review team taken a more lateral and innovative approach to their pursuit of a 
definition, this far more useful and equally credible version may have enabled a slightly 
different approach which could have resulted in a fuller examination of the role of the supply 
chain. 
McNulty rationally focused on the measurement of productivity but did not state in full the 
embarrassment of the productivity figure, as in the highly asset-intensive sector the normal 
expectation is that the greater the use the greater productivity and profit. 
Unit costs (i.e. the total cost of running the railway) per passenger kilometre 
have not improved since the mid-1990s. The Study’s initial “should cost” 
analysis, against the 2008/09 baseline used in the Study, suggested that GB 
rail’s costs ought to be 20-30% lower. Further benchmarking has identified an 
efficiency gap of 40% against four European comparators. Some of that 40% 
gap may be systemic, and therefore cannot be eliminated fully, but I believe 
that the industry should be aiming to achieve a 30% reduction in unit costs 
(i.e. costs per passenger-km) by 2018/19. (p. 5) 
The results of the general dismissal of the report are clear to see in the cost per passenger-
km achieved over the same period with no meaningful increase in productivity. Since 
McNulty, passenger-km cost has increased a further 13% which should have made delivering 
productivity improvements relatively easy. However, the stark reality of falling productivity 
remains evidenced in the industry (ORR, 2015). 
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Table 1 – Cost Per Passenger 
Year Passenger-km cost 
(franchised) 
Subsidy 
per mile 
TOC passenger 
revenue/passenger 
mile 
Total cost of 
use per mile 
2010 £53.3bn  £0.11   £0.21   £0.32  
2011 £55.9bn  £0.08   £0.22   £0.30  
2012 £58.1bn  £0.08   £0.23   £0.31  
2013 £58.1bn  £0.07   £0.24   £0.31  
2014 £61.8bn  £0.07   £0.24   £0.31  
2015 £63.6bn  £0.06   £0.25   £0.31  
2016 £65.0bn  £0.06 tbc  
(http://www.orr.gov.uk/statistics/published-stats/additional-datasets) 
If the productivity gains McNulty recommended had been made the cost per passenger mile 
would be £0.21 by 2018/19 and would need to have achieved £0.25 in 2015 on a straight-line 
basis. 
The initial value of the McNulty report can be seen in the launch of a range of initiatives over 
the year by DfT and NR, including deeper partnerships, the East West Alliance and the focus 
on innovative leasing models. 
McNulty recognised the complexity of the situation but worked within the paradox common 
to regulated sectors of centralised planning and control with a desire to unleash market 
forces, where the delineation between state and sector have become so blurred that in some 
respects the DfT has become the proxy of the railway sector in government rather than 
focusing on the key deliverables and providing leadership. 
This can be summarised as the rail sector not being a free market but characterised by the 
same management practices that were prevalent in the USSR, with 5 year plans and working 
towards fixed demand forecasts for key metrics through control periods and high level output 
specifications. 
The DfT has done significant work to fill the leadership vacuum in the sector, as can be seen 
in the DfT’s efforts to drive leadership into the industry with mixed results such as the RDG. 
The DfT list its priorities as: 
• Boosting economic growth and opportunity; 
• Building a One Nation Britain; 
• Improving journeys; 
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• Safe, secure and sustainable transport. (DfT, no date) 
The first two priorities relate directly to remits of other government departments such as BEIS 
and the Department for Communities and Local Government. A series of quick Google 
searches identify no significant joint working or commissions between these departments to 
identify transportation needs outside of the development of autonomous vehicles. The DfT 
has multiple work streams working closely with business operating in transport and 
specifically rail. A good example of disjointed activity is the work being conducted by BEIS for 
the Industry Strategy Green Paper and DfT’s Infrastructure Efficiency Strategy, which have 
many areas that overlap significantly. 
Amongst a complex web of relationships McNulty identified: 
“barriers to efficiency” and we have identified that amongst the principal 
barriers are fragmentation of structures and interfaces, the ways in which the 
roles of Government and industry have evolved, ineffective and misaligned 
incentives, a franchising system that does not encourage cost reduction 
sufficiently, management approaches that fall short of best-practice in a 
number of areas that are key cost drivers, and a railway culture which is not 
conducive to the partnership and continuous improvement approaches 
required for effective cost reduction. (p. 5) 
Many of the barriers identified above are interconnected, and they all come 
together in the industry’s culture and relationships. Despite some 
considerable thought on the matter, the Study remains uncertain as to 
whether the industry’s culture causes the lack of leadership at industry level, 
or whether the lack of leadership has contributed to the problems in 
relationships and culture. On balance, we think the latter explanation is more 
likely. (p. 10) 
Whilst McNulty does not dwell on the part played by the supply chain in this centrally planned 
world he tellingly only uses the word ‘failure’ once. 
There is poor application of supply chain management, including a poor take-
up of collaborative approaches around the high-risk and high-value 
procurements. This has, in part, been due to a failure to develop the right 
culture and behaviours, especially at senior management level. There is a lack 
of supply chain management skills and experience in the rail sector, with an 
emphasis on behaviours that are geared to traditional competitive 
procurement alone. (p. 56) 
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This failing of supply chain management can be seen in every aspect of the sector from 
recruitment of new leaders through to cost over-runs on electrification. An economist viewing 
the rail sector would view it as a series of failed markets as every aspect of the sector is 
dominated by monopolies, duopolies and oligopolies all, arguably, involved in rent-seeking 
behaviour. It is worth noting that according to the National Skills Academy for Rail fewer than 
20% of people in leadership roles in the sector have any formal training, coaching or 
mentoring for their role (Neil Robertson, CEO NSAR, addressing the RSG SME Conference April 
12, 2017). 
One of the few aspects of the report to be enacted was regarding innovation. The study 
recommends the creation of a leadership group to drive innovation in the industry 
drawing on models that have been used in the aerospace and automotive 
sectors, potentially to be known as the Rail Innovation and Growth Team 
(RIGT). It would focus on encouraging industry parties to innovate through 
identifying technological opportunities, showing where and how those parties 
could obtain returns for their investment, and would operate under the 
direction of the RSA. 
The RIGT would research and highlight potential areas for innovation, and 
match potential innovators with gaps in the market in areas such as IS, 
retailing and rolling stock, while recognising that innovation is not just about 
new technology, but also relates to processes and business ideas. (p. 59) 
This came to pass in a much reduced sense as the EIT, which subsequently became 
FutureRailway and is currently RSSB Innovation. It resides in the un-reconstituted RSSB. 
However, from the start there were problems beneath the surface, with some members of 
the team clear that promoting innovation for its own sake would not lead to a change in the 
delivery of innovation and that the key focus should be on organising industry-wide change, 
as envisaged by the McNulty review in the form of the Railway Innovation and Growth Team 
(RIGT)/Rail Systems Agency (RSA), and others who wanted to focus on the delivery of an 
innovation portfolio under the guise of the Technical Strategy Leadership Group innovation 
programme. This dichotomy was never resolved; time will tell if the ILG/TLG axis will do so. 
One of McNulty’s undelivered recommendations was that 
A small independent Change Team that is tasked with planning, coordination, 
monitoring and reviewing implementation across all elements of the industry 
of a complex series of actions – this team should include proven “change 
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agents” to facilitate action across the broad scope of this report’s 
recommendations. (p. 69) 
Arguably, the division within the EIT came down to a problem foreseen by McNulty in this 
unrealised requirement for an independent change for the mechanics of his proposal to 
succeed, with key team members wanting to focus on filling this gap in relation to the McNulty 
report. However, any move in this direction would have been doomed to failure as the group 
reported to RSSB and was under the auspice of the Technical Strategy Leadership Group 
whose remit did not include the change agency. 
The split within the EIT was focused solely on the delivery of innovation to market rather than 
the wider McNulty challenge. This tied back to the failure of the supply chain that McNulty 
had identified but not probed deeply. Understandably, in McNulty’s dialogue regarding 
market and market forces, 18 out of 21 items relate to the position of TOCs and Freight 
Operating Companies (FOCs) as being best placed to adapt to market signals and how DfT 
could enable more flexibility for these organisations to respond. An articulation of McNulty 
would be that there is no effective market for TOCs or users. The extrapolation of this, given 
the barriers to entry he identified, is the rent-seeking behaviour in every aspect of the sector; 
the absence of any significant cohesion or meaningful collaboration with the supply chain and 
from that near catastrophic failure of the rail sector as an effective and productive market 
place.  
Within the context of the EIT, the conclusion of part of the team seemed to become that the 
supply chain was well equipped and financed to deliver innovation into the rail sector, 
however the business cases and mechanisms for purchasing innovation were immature, with 
few if any significant organisations having the capability to purchase innovation. This failure 
to procure extended within RSSB, with the average time to sign an innovation contract 
remaining near to 12 months after initial award for the first 3 years and now dropping to 6 
months for the recent TOC16 competition. In short, this was a reinforcement of past failure 
or malaise. It seems to me that the team was allowed to operate in a bubble of its own making 
and lacked any real accountability or transparency in its actions to the sector. A lesson for the 
future would be to engage more effectively with a more diverse cross section of stakeholders.  
To bring this part of the story full circle it is worth taking note of the study team’s observations 
over what lessons, if any, there were to learn or to inform their own deliberations. So far as 
privatisation was concerned their conclusions were that it had to be considered a work in 
progress and nowhere near complete, at least in the terms that the original 1993 Railway Act 
envisaged. They also observed, as it turned out presciently, that the sector has a poor record 
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of actually implementing change. Of particular note was the 2004 White Paper The Future of 
Rail which had identified fragmentation, leadership and poor cost-control as areas of serious 
concern. The study team felt that due to this poor record of implementation the sector 
needed to concentrate on “evolution rather than revolution” (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 43), based 
on the premise that only so much change can be handled at any one time. I believe this to be 
misguided and later in this thesis I will make the case for better leadership, focused on the 
right changes delivered with confidence and momentum and, furthermore, that this 
leadership is pivotal to the act of change which in itself is the stimulus that the supply chain 
needs to thrive. 
In my experience there are few better sectors than the railway for defeating change by 
reducing the pace of it to zero through the implementation of multiple layers of meaningless 
bureaucracy, generally lacking in executive function. As George Muir, a previous leader of the 
Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) noted when talking about the layers of new 
bodies recommended by the McNulty team it is “Frankenstein, the fat controller” and then 
perhaps somewhat unfairly then likened it to “a manual on local authority organisation” (cited 
in Wolmar, 2011). One wonders what he might say about the current situation if asked to 
comment! 
4.12 Conclusions 
It is very clear from what the McNulty review found that there are numerous clear fault lines 
that run through the sector and that their genesis was predominantly the moment of 
privatisation, although the underlying condition may have been endemic even at that point, 
e.g., the reticence of the sector to be open and transparent. 
These vertical faults when combined with poor behaviours, lack of collaborative spirit, 360° 
adversarial relationships and low-grade leadership have served to create and sustain a 
distorted and dysfunctional market place for the supply chain to work with. The inability to 
create and sustain meaningful and structured change reduces the ability of the supply chain 
to innovate or novate and thus the marketplace remains in a period of stasis. The sector is as 
difficult today as it ever was, and has few if any parallels in the UK economy. 
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5 Why Does the Railway so Actively Exclude? 
I believe that one of the most damaging fault lines that has emerged from privatisation and 
is still apparent today, as we have seen in the McNulty study and more recent work, is the 
way in which the railway sector has created itself around a self-centred model. That is to say 
its default setting is in fact to create silos and be adversarial rather than collaborative, to 
‘game’ in a system of winners and losers:  
Players within GB rail are more inclined to follow approaches which maximise their 
position within their own silo, rather than optimising outcomes for the industry as a 
whole, for example in the areas of technology and innovation (McNulty, 2011, page 
10) 
In short, to create a default setting that excludes. This is a hugely corrosive behaviour and 
sets the bar high for would-be ‘interlopers’. In this chapter I will first set out what this silo 
mentality means in general and then specifically in the context of the rail sector. 
In her book The Silo Effect, Gillian Tett (2015) set out some clear observations on the way in 
which we as a species are hard-wired to arrange ourselves into easily definable sets, or silos. 
Later in this work I will look at how this silo mentality has led to constrained growth and sub-
optimal development in the rail sector at an industrial level. However, there is a deeper cause 
for concern. The railway is by its very nature a sector that lends itself to division in the sense 
that to be a player on the grand stage, i.e., a national operator or provider of hugely expensive 
systems whether they be trains, stations or signalling systems et al., needs to be a very large, 
corporate beast. 
Equally it is a system that is very focused on eliminating any variation of choice through the 
adoption of immutable rules, procedures and standards; this again “puts people and 
organisations in their place” (Tett, 2015). Applying another filter, that of the corporate body 
trading in the same space as the smaller enterprise, the clash of cultures embodied by the 
difference between the entrepreneur-led world of the SME bumping up against the risk-
averse, finance (cum shareholder return)-led world of the corporate is encountered. 
In the GB rail sector this leads to some interesting divisions along this cultural fault line, made 
more intractable as all the major corporates dominating the sector are foreign-owned and 
very much of their parent nations. The oil-and-water nature of this relationship is quite 
striking. At a more basic level it is a simple fact that the business culture and ethos that 
pervades the body corporate is fundamentally different to that of the supply chain, populated 
in the main by SMEs. The rail sector in the GB has a unique level of privatisation which drives 
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these behaviours. Large nationalised industries will typically be arrogant by their very nature 
and size. This is often neglected, I believe, because being nationalised they are seen to be ‘of 
the nation for the nation’. In a privatised sense this is not so clear and thus corporate 
arrogance lives in the space between the embodiment of pride in the company and all that it 
stands for and a commercial sense of xenophobia. The corporate motivation of these 
organisations leads back to wherever the company is actually based; there is no implied 
allegiance to the UK, nor is there any reason for this to be so. 
This simple facet when combined with our social inclination towards a mind-set that 
somehow sees a greater worth or standing when viewing a corporate as opposed to the 
patronising attitude towards the smaller business makes for a difficult mix, made all the more 
perplexing considering that the UK economy is made up of 99% SMEs employing 95% of the 
workforce (RSG, 2015). A part of the conundrum may be that we as a species can mentally 
only process a certain level of detail at any one time and we naturally seek to ‘chunk up’ data 
sets in order to handle them. In this context I would maintain that a chunk that is a 
Bombardier, Siemens, Alstom or Rolls Royce is easier to identify with than, say, that 
amorphous 99% SME in all its diversity. 
Drawing on the work and life experience of the French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu, Tett 
sets out what she describes as five of his most important concepts (2015, p. 43). Although 
they were set in the context of human nature within society I believe that they map directly 
across to business relationships and again frame the challenge posed by the clash of culture 
between the SME and the corporate. In the boxes below I have summarised Tett’s description 
of Bourdieu’s points and then provided a ‘translation’ across to the commercial domain. 
First, Bourdieu believed that human society creates certain patterns of thought 
and classification systems, which people use to arrange space, people and 
ideas. (Tett, 2015, p. 44) 
It is obvious to state that businesses reflect the society in which they trade. In doing so they 
also utilise the same patterns of thought and classifications: ‘the way of doing business’. 
Second, Bourdieu also believed that these patterns help to reproduce the 
status of the elite. Since this elite has an interest in preserving the status quo, 
it also has every interest to reinforce cultural maps, rules and taxonomies. 
(Tett, 2015, p. 44) 
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In commerce this then leads to the situation where an elite forms around wealth: business, 
unlike society, has an uncluttered ability to form hierarchies; it does not need to take account 
of heritage, upbringing, education, class and so on, merely the simple scale of the entity. The 
elite in this context, the corporate, therefore seek to preserve the status quo as that keeps 
them in a dominant market position. It follows, then, that their aim is to preserve the system 
not to change it (BEIS, 2017). 
Third, Bourdieu did not believe that the elite – or anyone else – created these 
cultural and mental maps deliberately. Instead, they arose as much from 
semiconscious instinct as conscious design, operating at the border of 
conscious and unconscious thought. (Tett, 2015, p. 44) 
If it is accepted that these maps form in an unstructured, unconscious fashion it is also true 
that they are ‘read’ by the elite and non-elite alike. They apply universally and are ingrained 
in a way that makes them seem natural and inevitable. They therefore set out how the market 
segment or sector may be navigated. There will of course in the case of business be a series 
of interrelated maps, the equivalent in society of trying to layer any number of similar cultures 
in the same geographical space. The OEM and Tier 1 would have a map that sets out their 
relationships with each other, and whilst the SME could read or attempt to use such a map it 
is more likely that it would need to ‘change scale’ and instead refer to another chart of the 
elites’ making. 
Fourth, Bourdieu believed that what really matters in a society’s mental map 
is not simply what is publicly and overtly stated, but what is not discussed. 
Social silences matter. The system ends up being propped up because it seems 
natural to leave certain topics ignored since these topics have been labelled as 
dull, taboo, obvious, or impolite. (Tett, 2015, p. 45) 
There is, I believe, a really important observation to be made here. What Bourdieu calls social 
silences are what is often called the elephant in the room. For a wide variety of reasons 
ranging from fear through to reluctant acquiescence, many discussions never take place, 
voices are not heard, lessons not learned and the boat not rocked. There is no contention that 
there is some form of conscious plot at work (although in my direct experience this is the case 
with a number of Tier 1 organisations within the sector). Bourdieu himself noted that “the 
most powerful forms of ideological effect are those which need no words, but merely a 
complicitous silence” (Tett, 2015, p. 45). To break this established status quo in society is a 
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significant task; in business, however, it is actually generally less complex. Within the rail 
sector there is a deeply entrenched sense of place and hierarchy, further complicated by 
history and culture. The sector is also highly conservative, resistant to change and has a 
market driven by tender which in itself is framed and subject to the interpretation of the UK 
government or EU law. The latter serves to reinforce the dominance of the few and their maps 
through their control of the tender process. 
A fifth key point that is implicit in Bourdieu’s work is that people do not always 
have to be trapped in the mental maps they inherit. We are not robots, blindly 
programmed to behave in certain ways. We can also have some choice about 
the patterns we use. (Tett, 2015, p. 45) 
Modern high-performing sectors have become adept at creating new maps and not accepting 
those which they have inherited. It is equally true that high-performing companies are the 
ones who either navigate better than their peers or have been able to create their own maps. 
Either way it is self-evident that some succeed whilst others stagnate or fail. In the UK 
economy at the time of writing there is a dramatic resurgence in the field of advanced 
manufacturing, and the automotive sector is out performing its European competitors by 
achieving record growth, is attracting significant levels of inward investment and is a global 
leader in R&D (Automotive Council, 2017b); similarly the aerospace sector is a “successful, 
vibrant, high-value, high technology engineering, manufacturing and service industry” (ADS, 
2017). I do not believe that the railway as a sector can be judged to be anywhere near as 
successful as its counterparts in these industries. 
As previously discussed this is a fragmented and disjointed sector, and this fragmentation has 
led to a culture of silo-based exclusion. What follows are, I believe, some important examples 
of this exclusion, an analysis of why it is so damaging and its consequences. In turn this 
behaviour will be related back to Bourdieu’s thinking and lead to a similar conclusion that in 
this case the railway sector does not have to be trapped in its current map. 
There are, I believe, three key generic areas of exclusion which have all been present since 
privatisation: 
• Corporate – organisations, competition, structures and complexity; 
• System – rules, standards, regulation and ‘financial’; 
• Individual – attitude, mind-set and culture. 
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5.1 Corporate 
The sector like many is dominated by corporate players; there is nothing intrinsically wrong 
with that. However, in the case of the rail sector the sheer scale of complexity throughout the 
domain has led to dominance and to rule by a small elite. This oligopoly in some cases has 
managed to retain near-monopoly positions held since the original breakup of BR, notably in 
the fields of component supply and rolling stock ownership. In other cases the erratic, saw-
tooth profile of procurement has seen the passing of all of the indigenous OEMs into either 
oblivion or foreign ownership and of the sector being dominated by foreign (mainly European 
– Hitachi being the exception to this) train builders. 
The infrastructure is predominantly owned by just four players (NR, TfL, HS1 and HS2) and all 
of the TOCs are also predominantly overseas constructs, themselves often derivatives of 
European state-owned subsidiaries. 
The net effect of foreign ownership is that whilst serious efforts are currently being made by 
the DfT to ensure UK content into new public sector programmes, i.e., the order of new train 
fleets and infrastructure builds, it would be naïve to think that this is actually little more than 
a sticking plaster on a major wound (too little too late). Given the nature of the EU and its 
fundamental regime of open trade, and of the trade relations with the USA and the Far East, 
UK companies are inevitably competing with overseas indigenous supply chains, and 
attempting to supply products, goods and services into manufacturers’ generic global 
platforms; increasingly, very few rail vehicles are designed exclusively for the GB market. 
Although it is too soon to know what difference the Brexit process will bring about, it can 
reasonably be assumed that it is unlikely to improve the lot of the UK supplier by any great 
margin, although there is hope in the work being conducted by the RSG Creating Conditions 
for Market Growth workstream. In the next section (System) I will provide an overview of the 
Treasury/departmental methodology that should provide a bias towards UK content but in 
fact entirely fails to do so. 
It has certainly not helped the situation that the government’s own departments have not 
been at all aligned until very recently. That the sector itself has been unable to speak with 
one voice is not surprising once you get past the false position that assumes there is such a 
thing as the ‘railway industry’; however, this same excuse does not work for government. 
Primus inter pares for the rail sector is clearly the DfT, supported by the likes of BEIS and the 
Treasury. 
It is only in the last 4 years, incrementally from 2013 when the former Minister of State for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS, now BEIS) Sir Vince Cable conceived and drove 
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establishment of the RSG as the latest sector council, that there has been a ‘minding of the 
gap’ between, in particular, the DfT and BEIS. The RSG is co-chaired by the two Secretaries of 
State and a senior private sector representative. The level of expertise and understanding in 
the DfT of detailed supply chain issues, beyond the wants and needs of the Tier 1/OEMs, is 
limited. It seems to have a complete blind spot regarding its own role leading not following a 
distorted market of its own making. 
Conversely, this understanding and empathy is highly advanced within BEIS as it is a core 
capability for them, and yet their detailed and comprehensive knowledge of the sector is 
limited. 
Fundamentally the two departments are in many ways oil and water. In the DfT corporate 
Single Departmental Plan 2015 to 2020, which was last updated in October 2016, its first 
objective is listed as “boosting economic growth and opportunity” (Section 1) and yet 
nowhere in this document does it actually reference the supply chain as relevant to the 
economy. This rather disappointingly leads towards a possible interpretation that the 
economic growth and opportunity in question has a more nebulous political meaning away 
from any recognition of the wider benefits accruing from or to the UK supply chain. In its 
conclusion where it highlights the other government departments with which it is 
collaborating it fails to mention BEIS at all, although it does at least in the penultimate bullet-
pointed paragraph of the entire document mention that it is “working with Crown 
Commercial Services to deliver the government’s 33% commitment of our spend with small 
and medium enterprises by 2020”. 
Initiatives such as the formation of the RSG have the potential to engage with these 
departments and to at least give visibility and scrutiny to some of these issues although this 
may be quite limited. On a positive note, the very existence of the RSG serves to force these 
two departments to work together much more proactively. The DfT has radically improved its 
overall business support performance since the formation of the Rail Executive which is (at 
the time of writing) called the Rail Group. Initiatives such as the Innovation in Franchising (IiF) 
Scheme, developed in conjunction with the Transport System Catapult and delivered through 
RSSB, have the potential to make a real impact as it provides a mechanism for realising the 
value of long-term investments whose payback period is beyond the length of the franchise, 
although the execution of the scheme has been disappointing to date. This scheme would I 
feel have been much stronger if the DfT had given it much more positive and competent 
leadership thereby negating the tendency for it to drift and not maintain the level of priority 
and attention it deserved. Instead TOC teams focussed quite rightly on the delivery of their 
contractual service obligations have in the main achieved little of any real substance in IiF. 
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Similarly the BEIS has made a significant change in recent years to its approach in that it has 
recruited more staff to work in the sector, has actively sought to develop its knowledge base 
and has enhanced its relationships with key sector organisations and businesses. It must also 
be given credit for the initiative and persistence it showed in creating the RSG in the first 
place. 
Later in this chapter, when I consider Bourdieu’s comments about not being trapped by the 
mental maps of others, I will examine the role of the RSG further and make some 
recommendations about how it could act to improve the lot of the indigenous UK supply chain 
through a closer relationship and greater alignment with the RDG, an issue that the McNulty 
study failed to deliver on. Whether this process survives in the current political and economic 
environment remains to be seen. It currently enjoys a high level of sector support and the 
challenge will be for the RSG Council to demonstrate its worth. 
The apparent willingness of the UK to routinely accept overseas ownership of major 
companies has led to a ‘careless indifference’ with regard to supply chain issues. There is an 
attitude that routinely merely looks to the best (lowest) price winning, with an almost total 
disregard to whole-life cost and to system value to the UK economy (this is by no means a 
particular characteristic of the railway sector and is a trend that stems in particular from the 
period of the Conservative government of the 1980s). Recent rolling stock procurements have 
started to buck this trend and there are now numerous initiatives, such as the TfL New Tube 
for London project which ensure that lowest whole life costs are considered. Overall though 
this is in marked contrast to countries like Germany, France (and the USA) who all have 
sophisticated ways of ensuring that the national value in terms of local input to major 
contracts is fully taken into account when awarding them; their perfectly legitimate use of EU 
instruments to this effect is in stark contrast to the UK approach (covered later in this 
chapter). 
All of this has served to reduce any real competition to a very small number of players. The 
dominance of a small number of very powerful companies has created an arrogant, 
adversarial culture and one that remains obfuscated by confusion and conflicting information. 
It is very difficult for a new supplier to enter this market place as the most basic of detail is 
not at all obvious and data is hard to derive. Even for major entities like NR there is no ‘road 
map’ which will guide and inform the route to market. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest 
that in the move towards a more regional approach there are likely to be different 
requirements around the country for essentially the vendor of the same product with the 
same end use to navigate. 
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5.1.1 So What? 
The supply chain that supports the sector is wide and varied. As demonstrated earlier it is 
estimated that over 95% of the railway supply chain is company participants which are not 
‘railway’ businesses, that is to say that rail business comprises less than 10% of their overall 
turnover. The conclusion that I draw from this is that for companies with little or no direct 
knowledge or expertise in the sector to have to navigate such a difficult and demanding 
landscape, for an unknown level of reward, will inevitably mean that the system, if it can be 
called such, protects and sustains the traditional or pre-existing supply base. This serves to 
reduce competition and to maintain barriers to entry. 
The privatisation process was rooted in an assumption that competition would drive costs 
down and value up; the McNulty review recognised the need for greater contestability (as 
have studies since) and the Rail Group in the DfT has as its first objective “the government’s 
response to the recommendations proposed by Sir Roy McNulty and subsequent proposals 
for the reform of the rail industry” (Gov.UK, 2017), yet there is no evidence that would 
support a corresponding surge in the state of health of the UK supply chain. Bourdieu’s 
observations prove accurate. The corporate narrative, whether in the private sector or 
government, has served to create a system that naturally inclines towards the elite of the 
multinational and maintains their standing unquestioned. Organisations such as trade 
associations that are reliant on this elite are inevitably compromised in their ability to 
represent the enormity of the supply chain and in fact reinforce the status quo. 
5.1.2 Case Study 
Good evidence of this is to be found in the following case study into the hypothesis that ‘new 
trains are the only way to win a franchise’. Typical of the complexity of the British railway 
system there is no easy way in which to ascertain whether this is a good or bad situation 
overall. The passenger gets new stock on which to travel, train-builders supply chains flourish 
whilst legacy rolling stock owners have a challenge with the value of their residual assets and 
the overhaul/refurbishment market suffers. I am grateful to Kevin Lane, the Managing 
Director of Onyxrail for his insight. 
It is the case that all new rail franchises are looking at the precedent set by (at the time of 
writing) the last two rail franchises (Northern Rail and TransPennine Express in late 2015), 
which has led to a view that the only way to win a new rail franchise is to completely replace 
the fleet with new trains. However, this has a silent but very dangerous effect on UK 
businesses. 
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The ‘new trains wins franchises’ issue causes profound problems not just for the ROSCOs 
(train leasing companies) but also for the whole UK supply chain. It is an increasingly pervasive 
destructive force. 
According to Kevin “it flies in the face of what the Department for International Trade is 
supposed to do and also is against policy on Northern Powerhouse, Midlands Engine and of 
course Brexit”. 
Engineering is a key government area for growth and protection during Brexit. The Chancellor 
Philip Hammond announced, as part of his 2017 Budget, new funding for policies aimed at 
bridging the skills gap, whilst this issue in the rail sector is a serious problem and has the ability 
to actually reduce available skills in rail by displacing them into larger international companies 
away from the indigenous SME base. 
Engineering is seen as the economic saviour and something that needs to rise in terms of 
contribution to GDP and employment; however, here is the impact of this situation: 
• Maintenance becomes tied into new train provision as long contracts, which will 
potentially mirror the length of the franchise. This affects the UK train maintainers and 
the UK maintenance supply chain which will no longer have this workstream available 
to them; 
• The new trains problem makes relatively new vehicles and very good existing vehicles 
virtually unleasable, as many were built for specific routes and purposes and they simply 
do not fit business models or routes elsewhere; 
• It creates an interesting conundrum for the leasing fraternity which is faced with the 
situation where financing a new train can be self-defeating as the new trains could 
displace their own assets on lease. It also changes the finance model as the new assets 
(trains) may have a very short life if the original hypothesis is true the next time a 
franchise is let. It would seem unlikely that this model can perpetuate and will rectify 
itself with the current rounds of tendering; 
• SMEs rely on the availability of a market that is approachable and available to those 
with the ability to continuously improve, seek technology to transfer from other sectors 
and to innovate. They provide UK employment, but they seldom have the financial size 
to meet the supplier profile required by new builders, whilst at a lower level they 
provide a valuable service to the industry and UK employment; 
• Companies like Onyxrail in the supply chain rely on there being older stock that has a 
perfectly suitable residual life to work on. This same stock also provides a platform for 
companies to demonstrate both their technical competence and their capability to 
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bring forward products and innovations that could be integrated into new bids, future-
proofing them; 
• The supply chain in the UK, based on experience, is very likely to be displaced in favour 
of the local and established suppliers to train builders which, although established in 
some cases in the UK, in reality answer to the demands of their parent boardrooms 
overseas. This inevitably results in UK taxpayer money supporting foreign companies 
and European employment and not UK companies and UK employment. This situation 
is of course not unique to the rail sector, however it is mitigated in the likes of the 
automotive sector by the high volumes of production and rapid turnover of models; 
creating more sustained and higher levels of demand. In rail there are a small number 
of high value longer term contracts  placed making the impact of “off-shoring” much 
more pronounced; 
• Finally to quote Kevin verbatim “UK companies like ours now have to go cap in hand to 
international new builders to place product against an established supply chain that is 
already predominantly outside of the UK. It is a very hard sell”. 
None of this is good news for the UK economy unless one takes only a very narrow view of 
cost and value, one that that does not take into account residual value, whole-life cost and 
the wider social/economic value to the broader reaches of the supply chain. The winners in 
this game are the international companies, many of which are, perversely, owned by the 
governments of European countries that increasingly run British railways. It is unclear 
whether the DfT has the capability to wrestle with the conflicting priority of providing a step 
change to the passenger experience which it seems to assume new trains will do and at the 
same time meet its key priority of “boosting economic growth and opportunity” (DfT, no 
date). At the present stage of the cycle with Brexit and the general growth in the UK economy 
I would maintain that we should be trying to break away from such behaviours not encourage 
them. Instead, as described at the start of this chapter, we are left to the elite ‘gaming’ the 
system and the government’s ‘careless indifference’. 
The upshot is that this could destroy what is left of the GB rail supply chain and damage the 
mechanism for vehicle financing by UK leasing companies. It is not a sustainable model for 
rail franchising and is deeply harmful to our indigenous rail sector and all who work within it. 
The final exclusion that I would like to highlight under this corporate section is that of 
government procurement. I am grateful to Anna Ince, the CEO of Resonate and leader of the 
Creating Conditions for Market Growth (CCMG) workstream of the RSG, for her extensive 
input, guidance and advice for what follows in this section. It is well understood that 
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procurement policies impact market conditions and therefore can be either an enabler or a 
barrier to growth. Indeed, the government’s Modern Industrial Strategy Pillar 5 ‘Improving 
Procurement’ states that “we must use strategic government procurement to drive 
innovation and enable the development of UK supply chains”. There has been a body of 
research in recent years into attempts at defining for the rail sector what Automotive calls its 
sticky technologies, or the equivalent of the attention that Aerospace puts into wings engines 
and seats. The underpinning work (RSSB, 2013) was conducted by AD Little for the Enabling 
Innovation Team (EIT – which became Future Railway and has subsequently been subsumed 
into RSSB). In the 4 years that have elapsed since this report there has been very little if any 
credible progress other than recent work emerging from the Modern Industrial Strategy in 
the form of the latest Government initiative around Sector Deals. For the rail sector this has 
taken the form of a proposal called One Railway: Digitally Connecting the Nation (RSG, 2018). 
Through the necessity to get universal cross sector support this proposal has a very tight focus 
and its original 3 pillars (Accelerating the delivery of the digital railway/Significantly enhancing 
the customer experience/Delivering a sustainable GB rail sector) have now been focussed 
onto a single vision and the pillars modified to be Transformation Through Digitisation, 
Pioneering Intelligent Mobility and Sustainable GB Rail Sector. This work is at a formative 
stage and it is difficult to predict what effect this will have on the sector as a whole, especially 
given the high level of DfT involvement, which experience says will restrain/inhibit innovation 
in the same way it did with the final results of the Rail Value for Money study. 
This section considers departmental level procurement practices in the rail sector. It does not 
attempt to cover the wider activities of the major buyer community. The detail of this paper 
was produced following meetings and desktop analysis by the RSG workstream. At the 
departmental level the process is driven by a combination of the HM Treasury Green Book 
(2013), the Public Sector Business Cases using the Five Case Model (HM Treasury, 2015b) and 
the DfT’s Transport Analysis Guidance (TAG) data book (DfT, 2017), commonly referred to as 
WebTAG. These in turn are heavily dependent on current EU legislation and even with Brexit 
in the future it is reasonable to assume that similar directives will take their place. Before 
drawing some conclusions on these directives I will outline what they are and where they fit. 
The current utilities sector European Parliament Directive (2014/25/EU) is implemented in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland through a statutory instrument (The Utilities Contracts 
Regulations 2016, SI 2016/274). There is a parallel statutory instrument for Scotland (The 
Utilities Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2016, SSI 2016/49). The rules and principles laid 
down in the directive apply to the water, energy, transport and postal sectors. Directive 
Breaking down the Barriers – the Participation Puzzle Colin Flack 
Why Does the Railway so Actively Exclude? 
 
 
45 
 
2014/25/EU takes into account the specific features of these sectors which play key roles in 
meeting society’s needs. 
The purpose of the new Directive 2014/25/EU is made very clear in the Recitals (4). 
Public procurement plays a key role in the Europe 2020 strategy, set out in the 
Commission Communication of 3 March 2010 entitled ‘Europe 2020, a 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (‘Europe 2020 strategy 
for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’), as one of the market-based 
instruments to be used to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
while ensuring the most efficient use of public funds. For that purpose, the 
public procurement rules adopted pursuant to Directive 2004/17/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (4) and Directive 2004/18/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (5) should be revised and modernised 
in order to increase the efficiency of public spending, facilitating in particular 
the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in public 
procurement and to enable procurers to make better use of public 
procurement in support of common societal goals [emphasis added]. There 
is also a need to clarify basic notions and concepts to ensure better legal 
certainty and to incorporate certain aspects of related well-established case-
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
There are a number of clauses specifically directing procurement in relation to SMEs: 
Market access opportunities’ (70), participation through appropriate 
categories (75), ‘adaption to the needs of SMEs’ by explicit use of lots and 
obligations therein as well as making ‘direct payments’ where appropriate 
(87), appropriate tendering timeframes (89), ‘Given the potential of SMEs for 
job creation, growth and innovation….encourage their participation……..this 
Directive as well as through initiatives at the national level’ (130). 
There are also a number of clauses specifically directing procurement in relation to 
innovation: 
Spur innovation … Buying innovative products, works and services plays a key 
role in improving the efficiency and quality of public services while addressing 
major societal challenges’(57); ‘Because of the importance of 
innovation…allow variants as often as possible’(58); ‘crucial to driving 
innovation, which is of great importance for future growth in Europe’(100); 
‘Given the potential of SMEs for job creation, growth and innovation … 
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encourage their participation … this Directive as well as through initiatives at 
the national level (130). Use of Innovation Partnerships (Article 49). 
Contract performance is key to enabling procurements to deliver wider economic benefits 
and Directive 2014/25/EU Chapter IV Contract performance states: 
Contracting entities may lay down special conditions relating to the 
performance of a contract, provided that they are linked to the subject-matter 
of the contract within the meaning of Article 82(3) and indicated in the call for 
competition or in the procurement documents. Those conditions may include 
economic, innovation-related, environmental, social or employment-related 
considerations. 
The UK enacted the new Directive through two statutory instruments: The Utilities Contracts 
Regulations 2016, SI 2016/274 and The Utilities Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2016, SSI 
2016/49. The UK statutory instruments do not have any recitals stating the purpose of the 
change. The phrase SME does not appear in the statutory instruments. There is no inclusion 
of more specific clauses to direct procurement in relation to SMEs, which is a very specific aim 
of the Directive. The word innovation mainly appears in relation to the use of Innovation 
Partnerships. The instrument’s contract performance clause in entirety replicates the EU 
Directive (Chapter 4, Clause 86). 
The net result is nicely summarised by Anna Ince in her Creating Market Conditions for 
Growth (CMCG) report to the RSG on the subject (RSG, 2017): 
The outcome for UK PLC is that the UK’s statutory instrument does not require 
the contracting parties to create procurement models for ‘adaption to the 
needs of SMEs’ or to ‘encourage their participation’. Nor are there specific 
requirements (outside Innovation Partnerships) related to innovation. This is 
a missed opportunity to drive innovation and strengthen the UK supply chain, 
which in turn drives export. Export is impossible without a strong home market 
and home reference sites. 
Both the anecdotal evidence and the evidence of the percentage of local 
content delivered though rail procurements in Western Europe suggest that 
the contract performance (Chapter IV) element of the Directive is used to its 
fullest extent by other European countries. The result is that these countries 
have a very large domestic rail industry, with embedded supply chains and 
high export volumes. In the UK, only 10% of railway equipment and 
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manufacturing revenue comes from exports, compared to 20% for France and 
50% for Germany. 
To return to the UK-specific detail, both the Green Book (inclusive of the five-case model) and 
WebTAG are appraisal and evaluation tools designed to prioritise one project or spend over 
another, rather than procurement tools. That is to say they are the essential tools that the 
department uses to establish its business case ultimately to Treasury to pursue a scheme or 
to sort one scheme from another. It should be noted that: 
• The aim of WebTAG is to provide specific transport guidance and its principles remain 
fully aligned with and tempered by the Green Book; 
• Socio-economic measures related to procurement are absent from the Green Book. 
Such measures are restricted to the proposed project. Therefore, a project’s evaluation 
score would be unaffected by whether or not there was UK content or consequent 
creation of UK intellectual property or skills. However, this issue is more complex than 
this as the five business-case model makes specific provision within its Strategic Case to 
ensure that it demonstrates “how the spending proposal fits in relation to national, 
regional and local policies, strategies and plans and furthers the required outcomes” 
(HM Treasury, 2015b, p. 11). It also goes on within the Economic Case to be clear that 
the “purpose of the Economic Case is to demonstrate that the spending proposal 
optimises public value (to the UK as a whole)”. As noted below, there would appear to 
be little or no traceability of these factors once subsumed into the overall business case; 
• There is also poor traceability from the WebTAG output, through the project 
authorisation process to contracting bodies (e.g., NR, TfL, HS2), to the final deliverable. 
This may well be because the aim of the business cases is to establish the case from 
within the department (DfT) to Treasury as its ‘customer’. This business case makes key 
assumptions about the procurement but it does so in the full knowledge that any such 
assumptions are not then carried forward into the tender process. This would be 
especially the case when the expenditure would actually be made by a third party such 
as NR or TfL (Transport for London). It is therefore entirely probable that although the 
business case may have assumed, based on good evidence, that there would a particular 
level of benefit to the UK indigenous supply chain in the widest sense, there would not 
be any real compulsion driving this forward. 
The work conducted so far by Anna Ince and her CMCG workstream, and drawn on heavily 
here, suggests that there is an issue to be addressed regarding the UK’s statutory instruments, 
which for some reason failed to mirror the 2014 Directive’s intent in relation to SMEs and 
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research and innovation. Notwithstanding the historical context for this, the government has 
made “improving procurement” one of the 10 pillars in its Modern Industrial Strategy Green 
Paper, along with “supporting businesses to start and grow” (BEIS, 2017, p. 11). The 
interpretation therefore of the EU Directive into UK legislation and the subsequent clear and 
unambiguous interpretation of that legislation by Government departments and contracting 
parties must be at the heart of “improving procurement” and, as the government notes, 
“these pillars all reinforce one another” (BEIS, 2017, p. 12); therefore, this is a call for systemic 
action to remove yet another force for exclusion. 
The interpretation of those statutory instruments by contracting parties and/or government 
departments needs to be better understood and more comprehensively addressed. The 
underlying reasons why UK contracting parties rarely (if at all) take account of “economic, 
innovation-related, environmental, social or employment-related considerations” are 
currently opaque (Public Contracts Regulations Commentary, 2015). It may be fair to assume 
that this is as result of ignorance rather than a wilful intention to omit. Equally the use of the 
word ‘may’ in the contract performance conditions (Chapter 4, Clause 86) would appear to 
allow an excuse for no direct action being taken in this regard by contracting parties. Specific 
actions in the form of clear leadership by government may be necessary to drive a change in 
contracting parties’ behaviour. 
The proposed Balanced Scorecard within the Industrial Strategy will need to be clearly and 
easily deliverable within the legal framework as it is and as it emerges. Ironically, the existing 
UK procurement statutory instruments would appear to be barriers in this respect where the 
EU Directive is not. The balanced scorecard principles will need to apply for procurements 
below £10m to drive sufficient change in SME participation and innovation through the supply 
chain. The RSG CCMG Working Group would like to see a level playing field with other EU 
countries suggesting, as a minimum, that the EU Procurement Directive thresholds should be 
applied, i.e., €414k for supply and service contracts/design contests, €5.1m for works 
contracts. Further, the Government’s target “to ensure a third of its total procurement spend 
is with small business by 2020” (RSG, 2016) will require specific measures for SMEs (along the 
lines of the Directive). 
The EU Directive (Recitals (1)) applies to “entities operating in the water, energy, transport 
and postal services sectors”. It is a working assumption, in relation to SMEs and research and 
innovation, that other utility sectors will mirror the rail experience, to a greater or lesser 
extent, since the key issue relates to the lack of specific clauses to direct procurement in the 
UK statutory instruments. The application of the “economic, innovation-related, 
environmental, social or employment-related considerations” may be more industry-specific 
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given that the UK statutory instruments replicate the EU Directive in relation to contract 
performance in its entirety. 
The Industrial Strategy Green Paper also cites the need for procurement improvement “in key 
industries like health and defence where Government’s role as customer provides unique 
opportunities to achieve wider benefits through procurement”. The key utilities procurement 
issues appear to be with the UK statutory instruments and therefore it may be supposed that 
the same underlying statutory or regulatory issues are replicated outside the utilities 
industries. The same issues may feature in the solutions to the procurement improvements 
required by Government in these sectors. 
The work by Anna Ince (RSG, 2017) and her team leads to a conclusion that it is not EU law 
and the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) process that is the barrier to UK 
indigenous growth, but rather it is UK legislation and/or erroneous interpretation by officials 
of the EU Directives. The simple act of amending the UK’s approach, initially in line with the 
EU Directive, would appear to be eminently achievable and of significant importance to the 
future success of UK PLC. 
The inescapable conclusion that I draw from this particular snapshot of the body corporate, 
whether governmental, institutional or private sector, is that there is clear evidence to 
suggest that they are acting to exclude through a mutual sense of indifference to the 
consequences of their actions. In the case of government it is guided by corporate individuals 
and consultants according to a map that does not have the granularity to understand the 
detail of the terrain. In the absence of clear leadership and political will there will be no 
change to this behaviour. From the perspective of the private sector or institutional body its 
ability to act relatively unencumbered by a wider responsibility for the supply chain and, 
through that, wider indigenous economic and social benefits is attractive. Again in the 
absence of clear legislation or official expectation to the contrary this demonstrates a poor 
grasp of corporate social responsibility but is not unlawful. 
5.2 System 
I have already established that railways are complex systems. I have also established that  GB, 
due to the act of privatisation, has a unique level of fragmentation and, through that, wide 
dispersal of information and knowledge sources. It also has a relatively small number of major 
(predominantly international) players on the supply side effectively forming an oligopoly, and 
the demand side is equally constrained to just a handful of customers, notably NR, TfL and 
the DfT. 
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The primary ‘guardians’ of the system are the same government department that 
commissions output (DfT), the Office of Rail and Road (ORR), the sector regulator which 
describes itself as the “economic regulator for railway infrastructure … the health and safety 
regulator for the rail industry as a whole… and the industry’s consumer and competition 
authority” (ORR, 2017) and the RSSB whose mission is, according to its website “through 
research, standards, analysis and insight, RSSB supports our members and stakeholders in 
driving improvements in health and wellbeing and delivering a safer, more efficient and 
sustainable rail system” (RSSB, 2017c). RSSB was set up in 2003 as a direct result of the 
recommendations that came out of Lord Cullen’s report into the Ladbroke Grove rail accident. 
It is the last of these three, the RSSB, which is the most likely touch-point for the supply chain 
as the DfT and ORR are geared more towards policy than commerce. The RSSB, however, 
provides, under its current constitution, an entry point to the world of rules, standards and 
compliance as well as a diminishing responsibility for the delivery of funding for innovation. 
The innovation mantle is passing to InnovateUK via RSSB at the moment as part of transitional 
arrangements. It is unclear at the time of writing as to how current schemes such as IiF (RSSB, 
2017a) will be taken forward, although this is likely to be heavily influenced by the newly 
formed Innovation Leadership Group (ILG) which has, as the name suggests, the role of 
providing leadership and governance to the coordination of innovation on behalf of the 
sector. The ILG answers via the Technology Leadership Group (TLG) to both the RDG and RSG. 
This plethora of bodies is in part what George Muir was reflecting on in the context of the 
McNulty study. In the context of providing shape and form to the newly published CDP and 
to the provision of much-needed transparency and a level of governance to the activities of 
the likes of RSSB these groups should be both effective and useful. However, to the further 
reaches of the supply chain looking to work in the sector they look confusing. This obfuscation 
is a recurring theme and one that will now be developed in the context of what the supply 
chain sees when trying to navigate the sector. 
Returning to the role of RSSB for standards, for many companies the starting point for their 
entry into the sector is to gain an understanding of what might be termed the ‘official 
standards’ they and their products, goods or services need to meet. The RSSB strategy for 
standards and their application has been designed to set out the key challenges and the 
industry-agreed actions related to them. Essentially this bridges the gap between the existing 
Railway Group Standards and wider global standards. RSSB describes this as follows: 
Railway Group Standards due to their narrow scope cannot be the only ‘go-to’ 
suite of standards for organisations to meet their legislative and commercial 
obligations. Users must take into account and rely on the wider suite of 
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standards including European/International standards (such as Technical 
Specifications for Interoperability), domestic standards (such as Rail Industry 
Standards), company standards and suitable and sufficient risk management 
processes to fully address their obligations. (RSSB, 2016) 
To put this into plain English, as a potential supplier to the sector, you need to work out what 
the implications of the pan-European Technical Specifications for Interoperability mean to 
you and the level of compliance required that is not covered by Railway Group Standards 
domestic standards. You may well find that this is not clear and indeed that if you have a new 
(to the railway) or innovative product that falls between the two the risk aversion of the sector 
is likely to mean you will spend a great deal of time and energy establishing a position. 
The next stage, although this may not follow any set sequence as it is entirely possible that a 
company does not learn of the challenges ‘in sequence’, is then to seek some form of product 
approval, which is the company standard. In the case of NR and many others in the buying 
community this is also the point at which the company discovers the requirement to become 
accredited to RISQS, the supplier pre-qualification service used by buyers of all products and 
services throughout the GB rail sector. 
To return to the point I made earlier about the fact that a very high percentage of companies 
in the railway supply chain are not railway companies (or would not describe themselves as 
such), and that at most they are marketing subcomponents or subsystems, this is a daunting 
place to navigate. To further challenge suppliers, their primary customer appears to be one 
of the corporate elite that I described in the previous section who of course know this system 
well and assume the ability and willingness of others to tackle it. Existing key suppliers at Tier 
1 and 2 are able to benefit from such a confusing and inconsistent landscape to the point that 
they are able to exploit their position to disadvantage potential new suppliers. Just to add 
another layer of challenge into this particular equation it is very difficult to establish basic 
business facts. The volume of sales that could be expected, some indication of purchase 
timeframes, and the potential value of sales are all numbers that are all but impossible to 
establish, as is who your actual customer is likely to be: an infrastructure owner, OEM, Tier 1 
integrator, TOC or ROSCO. It could be any of them; within NR this could vary according to 
region and within TOCs it could vary according to the nature of the lease. 
What we have, therefore, as previously described in Chapter 4, is a fragmented and complex  
system that has a distinct and natural or intuitive bias towards existing players, who in 
themselves may well be predominantly part of a foreign indigenous supply chain. There is 
little that is deliberate or contrived about this difficult system. It is both a classic example of 
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the law of unintended consequence, in this case starting with the untested assumption at 
privatisation that the simple act of introducing competition would solve the challenges 
presented to the government by British Rail and of the circumstances that Bourdieu described 
in stages 1 to 3 at the start of this chapter, namely a taxonomy that develops of its own accord 
creating patterns that help reproduce and sustain the status of the elite and reinforce the 
version of the map that is theirs; albeit in an assumed, semi-conscious manner. As he stated 
“the most powerful forms of ideological effect are those which need no words, but merely a 
complicitous silence” (in Tett, 2015 p. 45); the supply chain has grown to know its place and 
quickly recognises that in a relatively small marketplace that has had a tendency towards 
‘Buggins’ turn’ (The Phrase Finder, 2017) staying quiet is often the only way to stay in the 
game. 
5.3 Individual 
The final area of exclusion relates in the main to the mind-set, attitude and culture of the 
railway sector, in particular the character that tends to pervade and prevail. That the sector 
in this country has a glorious and distinguished past is not in question. It once was able to call 
itself an industry with the likes of Derby Works producing 200 wagons and 20 carriages a week 
in 1920 (it is an interesting irony that this same works started production in 1873 by 
assembling kits provided by the Pullman Company of Detroit – not dissimilar to much of the 
activity by Bombardier Transportation (BT) Derby today). However, in the 21st century it is 
most certainly not an industry and as I noted at the very start of this paper the specifically 
railway supply chain is a very small part indeed of the UK economy whereas the railway 
system’s output is a crucial economic enabler conveying as it does 1.65bn passengers and 
503.2m tonnes of freight per annum (RSSB, 2017b). 
This is in a way a continuation of the same pattern that has created the system and corporate 
maps I have mentioned previously in this chapter. Whilst many sectors (and industries) adopt 
behaviours that mark out the individual as from that ‘club’, in my experience the railway 
sector has a particular ability to return to a default setting that seeks to exclude ideas, goods, 
products and even people who are not from within. Because the vast bulk of the railway 
supply chain does not consist of railway companies  an obvious conclusion can be drawn from 
such behaviour that the motivation, whether conscious or not, is to exclude in order to reduce 
competition or reinforce status. The desire of primary organisations like NR and HS2 to reduce 
the number of companies in their direct supply chain allows the  systems/component supply 
chain integrators to  maintain a role acting as a ‘gatekeeper’. These integrators are 
unconstrained by viable competition and thus they are able to lever their near monopoly 
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position to the potential disadvantage of the supply base. Without doubt the Unlocking 
Innovation Scheme run by RIA on behalf of RSSB has had a positive impact in the sector, 
allowing a wider range of companies to network, collaborate and innovate in the company of 
interested Tier 1s and OEMs. However this program has run its course in terms of both 
funding and energy and would seem to not be a commercially sustainable model. 
Ultimately, corporates and systems are led and run, supported and sustained by people, 
individuals. It is they who create and reinforce the maps that sustain the exclusion. People 
like organisations to not have to remain prisoners of a particular mind-set or culture. The 
railway in recent years has made much of bringing in high-level leaders from outside of the 
sector, and indeed through bodies like the RSG it looks publically at least to seek learning from 
elsewhere. What it has not been at all successful at is to bring its staff with it on this journey. 
Until individual horizons are broadened the process of excluding rather than including will 
continue to handicap performance, reduce competitiveness and efficiency and reinforce 
barriers to entry. 
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6 Where do we go from here? The Missing Link… 
Whilst we have already seen that the McNulty review has been substantially ignored and 
many of its key recommendations diluted, there is merit in looking at some of what was 
developed and taken forward, most notably the formation of the RDG, which over time has 
managed to bring forward many of the recommendations or at least to fulfil the strategic 
intent in partnership with the DfT and ORR. This is important as it gives a glimpse of what 
might have been and of what could be. Although there were a number of reasons for the 
formation of the RDG, the key elements from the perspective of my work are those with a 
direct impact on the supply chain. The RDG’s roles and responsibilities were anticipated by 
the McNulty team in outline as: 
• A focus on “making happen what might not happen otherwise” with a principal regard 
to “developing, validating and monitoring the implementation of plans for the delivery 
of the cost savings identified by the Study” (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 46); 
• A sustainable commitment from senior C level executives from across the full breadth 
of the sector; 
• An encouragement of a whole-system approach, where appropriate, to improve 
efficiency; 
• To work with pre-existing pan-industry bodies, leveraging capabilities to encourage 
effective change. Importantly it was charged with reviewing the effectiveness going 
forward of such cross-industry groups and for the RDG to be pivotal in the establishment 
of the RSA, examined further below; 
• To encourage a change of culture within GB Rail (note a pan-sector role not just 
confined to their membership). The direction of movement towards “partnership, 
openness, and continuous improvement”; 
• The creation of effective interfaces with DfT and ORR whilst at the same time insuring 
that it acts without discrimination and independent of individual members’ interests. 
It is easy to see how, in the internecine way in which the sector tends to operate, that 
elements of these roles and responsibilities could be further cherry-picked or interpreted to 
suit. As the RDG was based on the ATOC structure (indeed the two merged completely in 
October 2016; RDG, 2017) then the intuitive avoidance of any competition between for 
example the Railway Industry Association, a trade association representing the interests of a 
narrow but influential part of the railway supply chain, inevitably led to a dilution of roles 
which was pan-industry. Thus it suited the parties involved to maintain what could be 
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described by them as a healthy gap but in reality was a sub-optimal protection of vested 
interests. 
Following on from the fourth bullet point above, it is worth noting, in the broader context, 
that McNulty was making the assumption that in parallel or concurrent with the formation of 
the RDG there would also be the creation of what it termed the RSA “to lead the industry in 
achieving technical excellence in standards management, technical integration, and driving 
innovation” (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 13). 
Prior to the final report’s publication the supporting work conducted by Arthur D. Little on 
the enhancement of innovation delivery into the sector had sought to establish that such an 
independent system authority would be different from the “former unsuccessful Strategic 
Rail Authority” (SRA) in the sense that its role would not be commercial or regulatory and 
instead primarily technical (Little, 2011, p. 13). Having said this the roles and responsibilities 
it outlines, when combined with the commentary provided, lead me to conclude that whilst 
the SRA may have been deemed a failure much of what the McNulty review implies is how to 
recreate it in a different guise or guises without actually saying so. 
Atkins, in its contribution to the McNulty process, concluded (and therefore recommended) 
that there was the need for an RIGT to be at the heart of taking forward innovation and the 
development of a technical strategy for the next 30 years, linking to other remarks about the 
need to create some order amongst such fragmentation (Atkins, 2011). Figure 6 shows its 
remit and position clearly: 
 
Figure 6 – Rail Innovation and Growth Team (Atkins, 2011) 
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Concomitant with the RSA and RIGT were a whole range of comments in the main report and 
both of the supporting works by Little and Atkins recognising the fact that there were serious 
weaknesses in the supply chain in terms of leadership. The extract below from the Executive 
Summary of Part One of the Atkins review is unequivocal: 
Our analysis revealed that the industry is underperforming at innovation and 
the most significant difficulties arise from poor behaviours, lack of a systemic 
perspective and difficulty in working across organisational boundaries, 
whether commercial, technical or managerial. As a result, business drivers are 
misaligned, conflicting and parochial and objectives are not aligned to deliver 
overall rail system benefit for the taxpayer. Whilst individual organisations 
within the industry have made, in some cases, significant investments in 
innovation capability, at best, they are able to succeed only within their own 
span of control and can only go beyond when the right systems leadership 
behaviours are present. (Atkins, 2011, p. 4)  
In the main report at Chapter 6.7 it further adds: 
There is poor application of supply chain management, including poor take-up 
of collaborative approaches … This has in part, been due to a failure to develop 
the right culture and behaviours, especially at senior management level. There 
is a lack of supply chain management skills and experience in the rail sector, 
with an emphasis on behaviours that are geared to traditional competitive 
procurement alone. Procurement practice is variable, with the buyer often far 
removed from the end user, protracted and inefficient tendering processes, 
and barriers preventing new suppliers from entering the market. (DfT/ORR, 
2011a, p. 56) 
In the same chapter the point is made that “effective supply chain management requires 
leadership from senior management delivered by appropriately-empowered, competent and 
engaged staff” (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 55). 
The reality has been that a perfect storm formed. There was clearly a high degree of ‘cherry-
picking’ of the report’s conclusions and even though major shortcomings were recognised in 
the leadership of the supply chain and the propensity of the system to resist/frustrate the 
uptake/encouragement of innovation were obvious, no clear route map emerged and 
became reality. Evidence for this can be found in the final publication where it was stated: 
The Study’s recommendations envisage major change, but change that is 
designed, as far as possible, to adapt existing structures rather than to sweep 
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them away, and to focus the efforts of all concerned primarily on the areas 
where efficiency can be improved rather than on total reorganisation. 
(DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 43) 
This single sentence I believe proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the study. In a sector as 
conservative and inward-looking as rail had become the notion that major change could be 
delivered by existing structures is to give life to the definition of insanity that comes from the 
expectation that you can expect different results by doing the same thing over and over again. 
The exclusive behaviours I described in Chapter 5 came into play and what has followed is 
witness to this. 
From the evidence I have reviewed in terms of both the full extent of the McNulty final 
report(s) and contemporaneous commentary in the railway press and work since, in much the 
same way that the Tory administration built privatisation on the sand of hope that was the 
ability of competition to act as bedrock, so too the McNulty Value for Money study set out a 
case that was built on the inter-relationships between its recommendations and the ability of 
the RDG to act in a way that would “promote best practice and identify what is required from 
the supply chain” (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 56). Whilst I believe that it is fair to say that the RDG is 
now indeed a cohesive and coherent force for good that is able to embrace much of what 
McNulty set out as vital, this has been achieved in no small part in spite of rather than because 
of government. 
The formation of the RSG in 2015 and the subsequent launch of its strategy in 2016 is a 
belated, but nonetheless welcome, attempt by government to address the many issues raised 
by McNulty but subsequently ignored. It is worthy of note that the pressure to form the RSG 
came from BIS in the first instance, with support from the DfT initially tardy. Unlike the RDG 
which from the outset benefited from “staff support provided by member companies and the 
Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) as necessary” (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 46) the 
RSG is effectively a self-starting entity, reliant on the benign support of its Council members 
and the beneficiary of a one-off and relatively small amount of government funding made 
possible only through an underspend. 
Aside from the fault lines that run through from privatisation to McNulty and the present day, 
most notably the issues surrounding fragmentation, another thread has been a preoccupation 
with the need for innovation as prerequisite to growth and efficiency in the sector. In the next 
chapter I will focus on what I believe this really means in the context of the railway of today, 
notably issues surrounding the absence of focus on continuous improvement linked to 
business as usual and the relationship with the uptake of innovation. This analysis will of 
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course remain focused on the issues surrounding the performance of the supply chain in the 
pursuit of a sector fit for the 21st century. 
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7 Innovation – the Lazy Man’s Consolation 
The word innovation and its various derivative forms has become one of the most ubiquitous 
words in the business lexicon, loved by politicians, academics and the common mortal. It is 
held by many to represent the holy grail of economy, the change agent of those seeking ever-
greater productivity and business success and yet, to misquote Monty Python, what has it 
ever done for us? 
This section takes a serious look at what we mean by innovation      The flaws in the word start 
to reveal themselves the moment you actually look at the definition of the verb innovate, 
which is much more modest than the attribution it commonly gets. Although definitions of 
this word are many, for the most part they centre on the notion of “making changes in 
something established, especially by introducing new methods, ideas, or products” (OED, 
2017). At the outset of the industrial revolution this word had a level of use it has never since 
achieved again in terms of common usage; however, it is interesting to note that at the time 
of the great feats of engineering and commerce that saw the emergence of the railway it was 
at its lowest ebb and that at that same time ingenuity was at its zenith. 
The reason that I feel this word has become sullied to the point of indifference is that it is a 
lazy expression. There are certain things in modern life that we dare not challenge due to the 
danger of being thought politically incorrect, a Luddite or downright dangerous. I believe it 
was Edmund Burke who said that “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good 
men to do nothing”. In this context I would maintain that the fact that people feel 
uncomfortable about questioning whether innovation is appropriate leads to a situation 
where its pursuit is a given almost without question. To compound this error, because there 
are perceived barriers to innovation a whole new industry has built up to demolish them in 
order to release or unlock innovation; or perhaps more precisely to gain access to what has 
been a considerable funding stream. There are seminars ‘unlocking’ it (RIA), departments 
‘enabling’ it (RSSB) and strategies ‘accelerating’ (DfT and NR) it; Directors, Professors and 
Champions of it. The apparent need for ‘innovation’ in almost any context is taken as a given 
and thus the trials and tribulations that follow are the fault of anyone but the innovator. The 
breaching of barriers and vanquishing of ‘Valleys of Death’ have almost crusade-like 
properties. 
It is, I believe, an abstract concept that rather like a religious mantra repeated over and over 
has achieved a status that places it beyond reproach or question. This is why I believe that it 
is lazy. The almost mindless acceptance of the need to ‘innovate’ has not led to any great 
strides in productivity, despite the millions of tax payer and private sector investment lavished 
Breaking down the Barriers – the Participation Puzzle Colin Flack 
Innovation – the Lazy Man’s Consolation 
 
 
60 
 
on it, and in the railway sector alone it is difficult to find examples that prove the case for the 
wholesale support of innovation per se. 
Innovate UK is the UK government’s innovation agency and seeks to drive productivity and 
growth by supporting businesses to realise the potential of new technologies, develop ideas 
and make them a commercial success. Formed in 2007 they have committed over £1.8Bn to 
innovation, matched by a similar amount in partner and business finding (IUK, 2018). In the 
main this disbursement of funding is through competitions, which in the case of the rail sector 
are now informed by official stakeholder bodies like the Innovation Leadership Group (ILG) 
and the Technology Leadership Group (TLG).It is perhaps no coincidence that within the 
railway sector the main beneficiaries of this type of support have been academic institutions, 
consultancies and corporate bodies. 
The real challenge is that innovation is but one small part of the equation. It has a place but 
it is not the defining moment. The main effort needs to be in getting the product to market, 
as that is where the market failure would seem to be. Or perhaps more importantly putting 
the effort into understanding the market so that its needs and wants are anticipated, met or 
even led? 
So when it comes to lazy, my real criticism is that we have vested in a single word hopes and 
dreams that are beyond its ability to deliver. In the same way that in many parts of the railway 
just to utter the words ‘safety critical’ stifles all debate and ends discussion; investment in 
terms of time, effort and money in innovation is always an unconditional positive answer. 
Innovate or Die is the battle cry… This leads to another inherent weakness: because 
innovation is treated as subject of its own it is most often the preserve of a discrete part of a 
company and therefore in isolation. I have yet to meet a Procurement or Commercial Director 
who has the responsibility for leading the uptake of innovation in a company, and yet these 
are the very people who own the process with which such goods and services may be bought. 
At the other end of the spectrum, in the SME world where the development of new goods, 
products or services is pivotal to profitability and therefore existence, the challenge is not in 
‘innovation’ – that is the lifeblood of the SME – it is in the route to market.  
Innovation is at the same time a playful hypnotic word, conjuring up the excitement of the 
new, cutting-edge even risky. It has a status that encourages the non-conformist, the slightly 
‘left field’. If I am in ‘innovation’ it bestows on me a level of techy geek, not ‘just’ mainstream. 
The problem here is that it is this very behaviour or characteristic that is its Achilles’ heel. To 
most senior people in large organisations innovation spells risk and threat. In an industry 
where most contracts are as a result of competitive tender, innovation is a four letter word: 
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RISK. The isolation of innovators from the rest of the business ultimately creates the 
conditions for mistrust and doubt epitomised in the misguided notions of the Valley of Death, 
etc. 
 Innovation all too often is taken to mean ‘invention’. This is by no means a universal truth, 
but if not invention then certainly innovation is taken to mean novel and new. In an industry 
which has seen its R&D spend decrease in proportion to the overall spend, it is simply the 
case that the sector cannot afford to be choosy about where its future comes from. All that is 
new is not necessarily good and all that is old is not necessarily bad. 
One of my close colleagues at Rail Alliance likes to make the point that for innovation to 
succeed it requires linked intelligence, creativity, purpose and support (in other words an 
ecosystem) and that in the last 20 years or so, this ecosystem has changed. 
• CLEVER people remain, but available intelligence (insight) is overwhelming; 
• CREATIVE people remain but within a more complex world, and have less time for 
‘serendipity’; 
• PURPOSE in the workplace remains, but has become spread too thin and become less 
‘individual meaningful or resonant’; 
• SUPPORT from our peers/stakeholders remains, but in diverse multi-stakeholder 
environments (rail), that support is more diffuse and slower to respond. 
On a practical level, innovation in terms of ‘taking action’, and ‘following through’ to deliver 
new value from previously unfamiliar ideas, technologies, products and services has become 
harder to achieve within a standard business and sector structure and business practices. So 
rather than admit that innovation requires organisational and sector upgrades, and system 
thinking, innovation has evolved to become almost intangible (and therefore unattainable).   
So much for innovation then; why should another word be so different or even make a 
difference? Well I will now set out the case for consigning the word innovation to the 20th 
century (Room 101) where it belongs and to embrace ingenuity, a word and concept for the 
21st century if ever there was one! 
Ingenuity was last in vogue when the great Victorian engineers were in full flow. Unlike 
innovation it is a word that as yet has not been saddled with the baggage of fame. It does, 
however, sum up so succinctly what it is that makes the British great: “ingenuity is the quality 
of being clever, original, and inventive, often in the process of applying ideas to solve 
problems or meet challenges” (Wikipedia, 2017). It is also interesting to note that ingenuity 
(ingenium) is the root Latin word for engineering! 
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What difference does a word make? I would contend a massive one as it gives us the game 
back and enables a paradigm shift. Whilst even I with my dislike of the word innovation would 
admit that in the context of engaging with the new and creative it is good, the real challenge 
here is to work to identify the critical parts of the ecosystem that will take the railway sector 
forward. 
Ingenious carries with it the notion that there is so much more to be achieved than merely 
coming up with a great product or idea, it is the whole journey that counts. The point of being 
clever is the tacit recognition that there is more to a good idea than meets the eye. Is there a 
market, is there a need, what are the barriers, how can they be overcome … is there a business 
case that stands up? Being clever means that you have taken all of this into account. How 
often have you heard the excuse that something was ‘ahead of its time’? It is easy to be benign 
but in reality too often it is an idea that is out of step with the market or one that has been 
poorly thought through and executed. Ingenuity is both human and mechanistic – you could 
say a type of ‘android’ – fusion of human insight and sentiment, and practical engineering 
thinking. 
Ingenuity brings with it the possibility of a fresh start, by learning from the fleeting 
appearance and shallow fame of innovation. Look at the sheer scale and diversity of the 
typically quoted synonyms: 
 
Figure 7 – Innovation Word Map 
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As I have previously described in this work, since privatisation, and arguably before, the 
railway supply chain is fragmented, complex and desperately difficult to engage with. The 
ingenuity that my own organisation, the Rail Alliance (RA), seeks is borne of a deep 
understanding of the multiple facets of the supply chain that serves the sector, one that 
recognises the chasm between stakeholders and the plethora of business models in play at 
any one time. Since the decades after the Second World War we have famously become a 
nation that has been brilliant at invention but hopeless at commercialising (House of Lords, 
2006), to the point of exploitation, the subsequent product. That, I would maintain, is the 
price of paying too much attention to innovation and too little to being ingenuous. 
To be ingenious gives us all a fresh start; it is so much more than just being ‘innovative’, it is 
a chance to reset the clock, start the journey from where we are today and with a better view 
of where we want to be. It is about applying our learning and understanding from the past 
but not being constrained by its rules and standards, embracing them as guidance for wise 
men not the obedience of fools. If we are genuinely to aspire to the greatness we are capable 
of then we must seek ingenuity and all that it makes possible. Innovation is just a tool in our 
bag like so many others; ingenuity is the mind-set that brought us the Industrial Revolution, 
the World Wide Web and Rugby Football. 
It is clear from both observation and interview that the railway as a sector regards innovation 
as something that warrants special treatment. It is, in my experience, always treated at best 
as something that needs to be considered in parallel to the everyday business. It is often 
confused with that which might be better termed continuous improvement and at worst is 
effectively quarantined, the domain of the Innovation Director or similar. In my interviews, 
professional life and studies I have yet to come across a single rail entity which actually 
manages to integrate innovation into the fabric or core of their business. 
There is a compelling view of innovation in the 21st century that considers that the true art of 
innovation is not in fact coming up with ‘big and new’ ideas but actually recombining ones 
that already exist. In their book The Second Machine Age Brynjolfsson and McAfee make the 
point that when you examine how major steps forward in human knowledge and ability to 
accomplish things actually occur, so the recombinant view of the world becomes convincing. 
They use the example of the way in which Kary Mullis won the 1993 Nobel Prize for Chemistry 
for the development of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) which is now accepted as the 
technique for replicating DNA sequences. They go on to recount how: 
The idea came to him on a night time drive in California, though he almost 
dismissed it out of hand. As he recounted in his Nobel Award acceptance 
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speech, “Somehow, I thought, it had to be an illusion … It was too easy … There 
was not a single unknown in the scheme. Every step involved had been done 
already”. “All” Mullis did was to recombine well-understood techniques in 
biochemistry to generate a new one. And yet it’s obvious Mullis’s 
recombination is an enormously valuable one. (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014, 
p. 78) 
There are two important factors here when one considers lessons for the rail sector. Firstly, 
due to the very nature and history of the sector and the way in which it is structured, i.e. risk-
averse, based on very short return on investment structures, etc., it has a very poor track 
record in terms of R&D spend. This decline over the years seems to match the overall decline 
in transport spend in terms of GDP, which in the 1820s saw railways alone account for 20% of 
GDP whereas by 2015 this had declined to 0.5% for all transport and logistics. 
At best, R&D spend levels sit at around 2% of revenue. At its simplest, therefore, the sector 
simply cannot afford to discover for itself. To quote the scholar Brian Arthur, so far as the 
sector is concerned “to invent something is to find it in what previously exists” (Arthur, 2009, 
p. 122). This is certainly a view that is held within the highly effective Innovation team at 
London Underground. 
Secondly, and leading on from the first point, even the most cursory examination of the 
railway supply chain shows, as previously discussed, that the large majority of companies in 
it are not from the sector at all. The conclusion that one can draw from this is therefore that 
what they have is the ability to bring to the sector ideas, products, goods and services that 
have been developed elsewhere and are potentially the very ‘known’ or existing elements 
that are looking to be recombined to create something which to the sector is considered 
innovative. Many will also bring a significant track record of R&D spending. The respected 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) 2017 Global Innovation 1000 study shows for example that 
companies like Cisco and Oracle who are potentially major players in the digital railway space, 
both feature in the top 25 and both register 13% and 18% respectively in terms of their annual 
spend against revenue. From the same report it can be seen that there are 4 automotive 
manufacturers also in the top 25 and their spends average 5%, well above railway levels. 
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8 Formula Rail – Challenge-Led, Performance-Driven 
 
Figure 8 – Formula Rail Logo 
I conceived the term Formula Rail as a label for a forward looking approach to creating a 
virtually integrated railway; it must be recognised however that this program is the result of 
significant work by the Rail Alliance team, led and inspired in this case by Chris Denison. This 
chapter moves my work closer to real life and deals with a particular methodology and 
approach that could be used to redress the apparent inability or unwillingness of the McNulty 
review to find and indeed fire a “silver bullet” (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 5). There is a comment 
later in the same paragraph that is interesting: 
“Achieving a 30% cost reduction will require a very substantial program of 
change, addressing each and every one of the barriers identified in this 
report, and doing so in ways that do not prevent achievement of other 
performance objectives.” (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 5) 
The text in bold above is really telling; it clearly makes the point that the report relied for its 
effectiveness on the sector being able to take a holistic, joined-up and synergistic approach 
going forward, something it has to date singularly failed to achieve for the reasons that I have 
already discussed. 
The publication in January 2017 of the Government’s Building our Industrial Strategy Green 
Paper has brought forward the potential for GB rail to recalibrate itself and to create a more 
focused identity. This is in no small part because of the ‘Sector Deals’ process that is being 
established as part of the 10 Pillar approach (Pillar 8 – Cultivating World-Leading Sectors) 
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(BEIS, 2017, pp. 8 and 20). The RSG and RDG have recognised that they need to work in unison 
in order to benefit from this process and that they need to create the conditions whereby 
they enable the railway of the 21st century to “speak with one voice” (outcome of joint session 
between RDG and RSG, London, April 19 2017). There is therefore a concerted effort from the 
private sector to both align itself holistically and to seek from that position of strength 
transformational change in the way in which the railway is organised and run. 
In essence it is highly likely that the process of creating a Sector Deal will see a proposal to 
government that will, as a consequence, have the effect of dramatically realigning the DfT 
and rationalising its powers and those of a whole range of associated QUANGOs and 
organisations (RSSB/ORR, etc.). It has been noted that the DfT has for a variety of reasons 
taken on a miscellany of roles that, in many cases, have merely failed to find another home 
or are legacy elements of previous ‘failed’ organisations like the SRA. It has retained a level of 
control over the rail sector that it does not have or even seek in other modes. Perhaps more 
importantly, it acts both directly and indirectly as the customer for and commissioner of rail 
services and yet fails to provide the strategic leadership required on behalf of UK PLC. Its 
ability to think and act strategically on behalf of the nation is degraded by its incessant 
vulnerability to political tinkering, previously described in Chapter 3 and in the work of the 
CRI at the University of Bath and of its own desire to sustain itself (Glaister, 2004). It has long 
been recognised that the department is part of the challenge not the solution. At a micro level 
it has regulations embedded in franchise agreements that result in TOCs having to seek 
ministerial sign-off for the authority to alter ticket office opening hours by even a minute 
across their networks. Conversely, their obsession with the competition mantra: 
notion that competition drives everything that is good in business is the 
bedrock on which modern capitalism, or neoliberalism to give the name of the 
credo that drives it, rests. Competition is the guiding principle for all economic 
activity, irrespective of the evidence or of the costs of trying to develop a 
competitive framework in a natural monopoly like the railways. Privatisation, 
outsourcing, fragmentation, and marketisation are its handmaidens. Nothing 
is of value that can’t be counted, no monopoly business can ever deliver good 
services, everything must be market tested – this is the constant refrain. 
(Wolmar, 2017) 
has led to a macro position which leads them to absolve themselves of all responsibility for 
the outcome of tendering and of the need to show any real leadership, falling back on a 
simplistic ethos of ‘following market demand’, which has a similar quality of justification as ‘I 
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was only following orders’. I would refer back to Bourdieu’s fifth principle from Chapter 5: we 
are capable of making choices and do not have to follow the maps of others. 
This has certainly been the case in the rail-focused elements of academia where a number of 
leading universities, who have in the past competed with each other, have taken the step of 
developing a Higher Education Funding Council for England funding proposal under a Higher 
Education Institution UK Research Partnership Investment Fund 2018–19 application to 
create the UK Rail Research and Innovation Network (UKRRIN). Although this is a partnership 
between the universities of: 
Birmingham (UoB) 
Huddersfield (UoH) 
Southampton (Soton) 
Newcastle (NU) 
Sheffield (UoS) 
Nottingham (UoN) and 
Heriot-Watt (HW) 
it is also a collaboration between a very wide range of other organisations and the private 
sector. Notably, it has secured a level of match funding commitments from the private sector 
as well as the direct support of the RSG and RDG through both TLG and ILG, respectively. The 
following is an extract from the bid document: 
In partnership with the rail industry, the UK’s leading rail research universities 
propose to establish the UK Rail Research and Innovation Network (UKRRIN). 
This will be an internationally unique, world-class Network of Centres of 
Excellence bringing together academic and industry partners to deliver new 
challenge-led research, accelerate technology development and deploy 
innovative products into the rail industry. Supported by Government and key 
industry bodies, including the Rail Supply Group (RSG) and Rail Delivery Group 
(RDG) this multimillion pound initiative is recognised as being critical to the 
delivery of the rail sector’s industrial strategy for growth and long-term 
success, enabled through world-class science and innovation. UKRRIN will 
future proof the GB rail industry through innovation and collaboration by 
creating opportunities that will boost the UK economy and drive productivity. 
This bid is a logical evolution of the wider Rail Research UK Association (www.rruka.org.uk) 
academic partnership between 50 universities which have a varying level of engagement with 
the rail sector. In another important lesson for the sector at large this bid was conceived by 
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UoB and has been led by them; in other words, it has had the real benefit from the focus of a 
strong but inclusive ‘single voice’ and yet has managed to garner universal support across a 
very diverse range, bringing commercial and academic competitors together to collaborate 
and benefit from the strength of the whole not merely the sum of the parts. 
Although this bid has become an industry-wide initiative it is in fact an amalgam of what was 
two very different proposals. The EIT and NR were exploring a program titled Project Pioneer 
which encompassed a ‘centres of excellence’ element. It failed to gain any real momentum 
although many elements of it were perfectly credible. UoB had previously attempted a Higher 
Education Funding Council for England bid, and the current UKRRIN proposal is a direct 
development of that. The RSG in particular has latched on to this latter bid and developed 
what was written in its strategy document to align with it. In itself this is not an issue although 
what started as a relatively clear academia-led proposal has now collected some important 
‘baggage’, in particular the following two project objectives (extract from UKRRIN, 2017, p. 
4): 
Table 2 – Future Rail Project Objectives 
Objective Outputs 
(to deliver objectives) 
Outcomes 
(to measure success) 
Providing leadership in rail 
research and innovation 
globally 
Establish the UK as the global 
centre for rail research, 
innovation and leaders in 
deployment 
Academic partners will develop new 
international relationships in every 
global region of the world within the 
first 3 years of operation, providing 
access to new research funding 
Industrial partners increasing their 
exports, from 7% to over 10% through 
innovative products and services 
exports developed in the centres 
Delivering transformational 
innovation and accelerated 
uptake of rail systems 
technologies by the UK rail 
industry 
New programmes of research, 
innovation and demonstrator 
activity with industry partners at 
the centres and deployment to 
the rail network 
Double the numbers of technology 
innovations and patents filed by the 
academic partners and delivered into 
the rail sector over the first 7 years of 
the centres’ operation 
 
I believe these two objectives begin to reveal areas of potential conflict. The first column 
makes a bold statement about leadership but by the second this has changed gently to 
becoming “leaders in deployment”; by the time outcomes are considered there is nothing 
suggesting this is a feature at all. There is a clear difference between being a leading centre 
and providing leadership! 
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Second, in the next objective, the output has a level of credibility although the execution of 
this objective will rely heavily on the industry partners integral to the program; without the 
appropriate level of commitment from them it would be hard to understand the provenance 
of the notion that the academic base has in “delivering transformational innovation”, i.e. at 
the higher Technology Readiness Level and from that why it believes it could “accelerate the 
uptake of rail systems technologies” when this has not been the case to date. In the final box, 
outcomes, the success measure moves back to academia but leaves itself a hostage to fortune 
by pinning its innovation and patent count on the rail sector’s ability to deploy them. This 
series would seem to do little to build confidence that a) such IPR would be protected to the 
benefit of UK PLC and b) that there would seem little encouragement for the SME looking for 
early research succour. 
My concern with this proposal is that it appears likely to become mired in the current railway 
bureaucracies, organisations and mind-sets that have failed to deliver any real step change in 
the last 20 years, instead of being truly focused on the development and delivery of 
coordinated world-leading research. 
On a more positive note, the bid relies on the support of existing test track facilities, namely 
the two NR Railway Innovation and Development Centres (RIDC), London Underground 
Limited Acton facility and the privately owned Quinton Rail Technology Centre (QRTC). The 
table below sets out the overall capabilities of a number of these centres and places them in 
the context of other global sites. It can be seen that the sum total of capabilities actually 
meets virtually all needs and eventualities and that, with the exception of the provision of 
dynamic test rigs, the three UK locations cover everything that is available individually or 
collectively elsewhere. The UKRRIN partners provide a wide range of test rigs, thereby 
covering this aspect. 
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Table 3 – Test Facility Capabilities 
 
As a footnote to the UKRRIN bid it is worth noting that since privatisation the academic 
institutional bodies connected with rail have flourished. Had the former Railway Technical 
Centre at Derby still been in existence this may have still been the case although I would 
postulate that, unlike the wider commercial part of the rail sector where the fundamental 
model remains flawed and assumptions about the power of competition wrong, the modern, 
global academic sector has been able to adapt to meet the market’s needs and clearly 
benefited from the considerable, government-initiated, research project budgets. It is beyond 
the scope of my work to evaluate whether or not this has represented good value for money 
or indeed has met the sector’s needs. From my own direct experience I can say with 
conviction that the way in which innovation funding has been spent is, however, sub-optimal 
 
NAME OF FACILITY Velim Valenciennes Wildenrath Melton (NR) Tuxford (NR) 
Long 
Marston 
Japan Colorado 
Location Czech Rep France Germany 
UK 
 
UK 
 
UK 
 
Japan USA 
Status existing existing existing existing existing existing* existing* existing 
TRACK CHARACTERISTICS         
Circle Y Y Y N N Y Y Y 
Track Length Km 13.5 / 4 2.75 /1.8/1.8 6/2.5 32 22 4 3.2 77 
Track Length Miles 8 / 2.5 1.7/1.1/1.1 3.75/1.6 20.0 14.0 2.5 2.0 48 
Speed Km/h >210 100 >160 >160 100.0 80 100 80 
Speed mph >130 63 >100 >100 62.5 50 62.5 50 
min Curvature radius m 300 190 200 300 <80 <80 <100 <100 
Max Curvature radius m 4000 3600 600 3000 >4000 >800 >1000 >800 
Max Axle Load Tons 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 <25 
ELECTRIFICATION         
LIVE 25Kv AC and or DC overhead Y/Y Y/Y Y Y/N N Y/Y Y Y 
LIVE 750VDC Three Rail N Y N Y N P N N 
LIVE 750VDC Four Rail (LUL) N N N Y N P N N 
DELIVERABLE OUTPUTS         
Crash Testing EN15227 – European TSI Y N N N N Y N Y 
Non-stop mileage tests Y Y N N N Y Y Y 
High speed testing <100k Y Y Y Y Y P Y N 
Workshops Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Multi vehicle Test Buildings Y N Y Y  Y Y Y 
Dynamic Test Rigs N N N N N P NK Y 
Lab coaches Y N Y N N Y N Y 
Equipment Dev Vehs N N N N N Y Y Y 
On Track Plant Testing Y Y Y N Y Y N Y 
Track Defect  / Cant adjustment Y Y Y N Y Y N Y 
Adhesion test (1:25) Y N N N Y P N Y 
ECTS/SWIFT Development. Y Y Y Y P Y N ? 
Signal interference Testing Y Y Y Y N Y Y N 
UIC / RGS / TSI  Compliance Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Passenger Evacuation Tests N N N N N Y Y Y 
Infrastructure gauging Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 
Traction supplied Y Y Y N N Y NK Y 
Simulation (platforms etc) N N N N N Y NK N 
Training Facilities N Y Y N Y Y N N 
Noise Testing Y Y Y N Y P Y Y 
Light Rail facilities Y Y Y N N Y Y Y 
All year round access 24/7 Y Y Y N N Y N Y 
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and that there is a widespread belief that the sector, despite having been disbursed 
considerable funding, has not really made any step changes over the period since the McNulty 
review. The review highlighted the low level of innovation maturity, and later in this chapter 
I will explain the model developed by RSSB to help monitor and stimulate improvement; 
however, there is very little evidence to suggest anything more than a gently improving 
organic trend, which in part may be distorted by companies and individuals ability to ‘game’ 
the process. 
In his book The Great Degeneration, based on his 2012 Reith Lectures, the scholar Niall 
Ferguson drew parallels between Charles Darwin’s work on evolution and the behaviour and 
nature of commercial markets, financial in particular: 
“Like the wild animals of the Serengeti, individuals and firms are in constant 
struggle for existence, a contest over finite resources. Natural selection 
operates, in that any innovation (or mutation, in nature’s terms) will flourish 
or will die depending on how well it suits its environment.” (Ferguson, 2012, 
p. 63) 
The Formula Rail process is cognisant of the nuances of the sector, its current challenges, 
future ambitions and multiplicitous ecosystems, of the fact that the very environment and its 
‘rules’ are subject to change and re-interpretation by politicians, officials and a wide variety 
of other players. It is, I believe, original work and a unique approach, providing a 
comprehensive and yet unobtrusive way of creating synergies and networks where none 
currently exist. It creates a synthetic structure which effectively closes the gaps caused by the 
fragmentation of the sector. 
The narrative, provenance and development of Formula Rail is described below. 
8.1 Context 
It is clear that attempts to increase levels of innovation in the rail sector are continuing to 
demonstrate a penchant for a predominantly top-down approach, with the UK government 
and the corporates (infrastructure owners/OEMs/operators) creating a compelling case for 
supply chain innovation, then deploying a variety of organic (mundane) mechanisms to 
respond to that case. 
However, the scale of the change of magnitude sought demands a clear, common and 
compelling target, a credible delivery rationale and a channelled, dynamic mechanism 
(process), plus strong intellectual and emotional attachment of all stakeholders to both the 
target and mechanism. The current approaches fall far short of satisfying these demands. 
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There is seldom a clear target, delivery mechanism or rationale. There is currently no fully 
representative/empowered stakeholder community. There is no real intellectual or 
emotional attachment. 
This, I believe, leaves GB rail exposed to ineffectual rail cost planning/budgeting, increasing 
alienation from passengers, risk to the welfare of a talented pool of human capital, and lost 
opportunity for UK growth/increased productivity. 
This chapter tracks the development of a new and alternative model, method and mechanism 
that have evolved from a decade of experience forming and then leading the Rail Alliance. 
The general format of what follows is different from the rest of this work. It is a range of 
extended observation and short-term insight followed by response or activity stream. 
8.2 PHASE 1 – THE RAIL ALLIANCE 
The Rail Alliance was formed in response to both the perceived need for greater supplier 
diversity in the rail supply chain and, from that, the need to support companies, not already 
immersed in the sector, to navigate a route to market. Supplier diversity was and is 
considered a significant inhibitor to innovation or the introduction of better performance 
methods, technologies, products and service to the GB rail supply chain. 
8.2.1 Observation 
By comparing supplier diversity in Rail against other sectors such as automotive and 
aerospace it is clear that the supply chain diversity in both of those industries and its resulting 
impact was compelling. Even though the structure of the GB rail sector is unlike other sectors 
in terms of its governance, there was no evidence to suggest that rail would not benefit 
significantly from the employment of expertise, technologies, products and services that were 
born and/or evolved within strong R&D and innovation environments and sectors outside the 
rail supply chain, A hypothesis backed by the fact that such a high percentage of rail sector 
supply chain companies are not per se railway businesses. Whilst there may be myriad ways 
to define a railway company, perhaps the simplest test would be that these companies would 
not qualify to be members of Railway Industry Association or the Rail Forum East Midlands 
e.g. that their turnover in rail was too small or that they are not UK/East Midlands 
registered/owned companies. Although not a fashionable view there is very little about the 
technology demands of the railway that are unique to it. 
8.2.2 The Rail Alliance: the Response 
In response, the Rail Alliance was founded, presenting a practical and economical approach 
for supporting suppliers interested in contributing to the rail supply chain. Through the core 
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Rail Alliance membership service, any supplier could now express their interest and explore 
the opportunities in rail, and begin to match their expertise against the diffuse rigours and 
requirements of the rail supply chain. 
The Rail Alliance was created to develop and deliver a number of initiatives (MAS-WM, 2006) 
based on the work done by a combination of the then Department for Trade and Industry 
(now BEIS) and Advantage West Midlands (AWM), the regional Development Agency. These 
initiatives focused on delivery of the following benefits and proportions from a total score of 
200 (the rationale behind this particular scoring metric was lost amongst the dissolution of 
AWM): 
• Support the development of supplier rail acumen through networking suppliers and 
buyers to create meaningful dialogue (100); 
• Perform as the rail sector ingenuity hub (75); 
• Provide guidance on supplier qualification required for the GB rail supply chain (10); 
• Communicate supply chain opportunities to suppliers (10); 
• Support supplier solution design and testing (5). 
This has formed the foundation to position the Rail Alliance as the largest (approaching 500 
members) and best-recognised supplier gateway to GB rail. 
8.2.3 Key Insights from 2007+ 
• The timing of engagement between a supplier and a prospective buyer is critical, with 
a preference for early engagement wherever possible (i.e., following the simple 
principle that it is better to fail quickly and move on). However, this is challenging when 
often facing poor or limited buyer appetite, weak drivers for early engagement and poor 
supply chain understanding; 
• There remains a significant supplier acumen gap, with respect to knowledge of sector, 
buyer and solution preferences. Developing supplier acumen to the level required is not 
possible through simple ‘one to many’ events, due to a significant cost implication for 
codifying and delivering knowledge and insight to potential supplier; 
• Buyers continue to demonstrate poor appetite for ‘opportunistic’ dialogue and 
engagement (weak drivers). Plus, the buyer design and procurement function favours 
conventional (familiar and predictable) approaches. Supplier original (unfamiliar and 
unpredictable) offerings are seen as non-core and require an alternative ‘approach’, 
positioned somewhere between traditional design and procurement (e.g., NR 
Governance for Railway Investment Projects process) and pure R&D (often an opaque 
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internal process). Buyers for the most part simply do not have the expertise or pressures 
to evolve their businesses to accommodate novel or original supplier offerings; 
• In the past the DfT funded and, through a combination of RSSB and InnovateUK, guided 
innovation in the rail sector, but it was not clearly defined, expressed in terms of 
demand or driven (led). The DfT effectively limited its innovation responsibility to 
encouragement for market-driven innovation through schemes including the IiF 
scheme, competitions and contractual recommendations for other large procuring 
organisations. In more recent times there has been an upgrade of the RTS (first 
published in 2007 then updated in 2012) in the form of the RTS CDP. The aim of the CDP 
is to align the sector onto a single plan. In the words of Graham Hopkins, (chair of the 
TLG and NR’s Group Director for Safety, Technical and Engineering): 
A plan that focuses our efforts, expertise, investment so that we are indeed 
doing the right things, once, in priority order. A plan that ensures the 
ambition for new products, systems and equipment is matched by the 
facilities to support research, development, simulations testing and 
validation. 
The ILG and TLG are the bodies that will act in partnership to ensure alignment of 
activity with the core plan. They do this through industry led workstreams and are 
accountable for delivery to RDG/RSG 
8.2.4 Rail Alliance as the Creator of a Network of Networks 
The Rail Alliance’s strength has been the ability to remain focused on its core purpose, that 
of using its ever-increasing and complex network to support the development of supplier 
acumen. The railway as part of the transport sector is inextricably linked to other elements of 
critical national infrastructure (see Figure 9) which, are in their own right, complex and highly 
interdependent and interconnected. 
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Figure 9 – A Network of Networks (Gao, 2014, p. 348) 
Studies of such networks at a macro level show how “failure of nodes in one network leads 
to the failure of dependent nodes in other networks, which in turn may cause further damage 
to the first network” (Gao, 2014, p. 347). The CDP recognises that: 
The railway is a tightly coupled ‘system of systems’ where changes to any part 
can have significant implications for other parts of the system. This 
interdependency between track infrastructure, rolling stock and command 
and control and communications together with the structure of the GB rail 
industry creates a highly complex system with myriad interdependencies and 
misaligned incentives. (RSSB, 2017b, p. 9) 
Taking these two sets of comments at face value in the context of a fragmented and disjointed 
system you have a recipe for disaster. In its own modest way what the Rail Alliance was 
created for and manages to achieve is to assist the supply chain in understanding what it is 
actually looking at and to reveal the areas of failure in order to make sense of the complexity. 
In its endeavours to achieve this it has a number of tools. 
First, at a macro level the Alliance is a full Council member of the RSG. This enables it to 
influence at the industry and political level as well as to learn from this forum. Here it has 
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been particularly successful in ensuring that the wants and needs of the SME are recognised 
and addressed. 
Second, it provides a unique level of support to companies through a wide range of 
networking events and activities. These enable companies, whether in the sector or not, to 
build their knowledge, extend their contact reach and ultimately to enhance acumen. 
8.2.5 Networking Insight 
• The ability to provide a regular platform for companies to build their contacts in a 
focused and benign way is highly useful. In a fragmented sector this provides an 
alternative to the random process of sending brochures and materials to potential 
customers; 
• From a buyer’s perspective, again the scale of diversity of companies at such events is 
in itself an educational experience. It also provides a useful opportunity to communicate 
‘one to many’ and to gain insight into what may be available from non-traditional 
sources. 
Next, it has been responsible for the development and delivery of a number of national 
business coaching and mentoring schemes, both on behalf of its own membership and of 
government departments (BIS, 2014) and latterly the RSG itself. 
 
Figure 10 – Filtering Process 
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The mentoring scheme (www.railmentor.com) helps to build supplier acumen through 
coaching of specific task-related aspects of their business plan and then mentoring the 
suppliers as they explore ways and means for supporting more frequent (opportunistic) 
supplier/buyer engagement. The Alliance successfully made the case for the mentoring 
scheme based on acknowledgement of the scale and impact of the divide between suppliers 
and large rail buying organisations, barriers to buyer interest, procurement and adoption of 
novel supplier technologies, products and solutions. 
8.2.6 Mentoring Programme Insight 
• Timing and the nature (subject or theme) of supplier/buyer engagement is critical. As 
before, buyers demonstrate a weak appetite for opportunistic dialogue and 
engagement; 
• The mentoring process frames supplier/buyer dialogue and engagement based on an 
artificial or unnatural timeline and theme, and does not readily embrace a buyer 
prioritised or buyer conversant/confident opportunity horizon; 
• Mentoring does, however, support the development of supplier acumen. However, this 
acumen is limited to knowledge of individual buyers with a limited context of specific 
opportunities (i.e., reasons for buyer motivation); 
• For the most part, buyer dialogue painted a picture of being beholden to a constrained 
master; this was particularly the case with certain well-established Tier 1 parts vendors 
and system integrators. Interest and appreciation in innovation did and does exist, but 
conditions for innovation were understandably weak at best or more often non-
existent; 
• The mentoring programme was only available to suppliers, for a specific period as part 
of a funded scheme. This program in that format has now run its course; 
• Due to the funding and resource allocation this was by definition only a light-touch 
scheme. 
Fourth, the Rail Alliance made the case to the DfT (Test Facility Steering Group) through the 
RSSB for a Testing Voucher Scheme (TVS) to encourage product development (Technology 
Readiness Levels 6 to 8) in the GB rail supply chain by delivering subsidised testing and trialling 
to qualifying suppliers, using the facilities at QRTC at Long Marston, near Stratford-on-Avon. 
One of the reasons why the Rail Alliance was successful (with the original tender plus a recent 
OJEU tendering for a second programme) was the close proximity of the Rail Alliance to 
supporting the needs of thousands of suppliers serving or keen to serve GB rail. 
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8.2.7 Testing Voucher Scheme Insight 
• Although a valuable mechanism for helping suppliers prepare their offerings for rail 
accreditation, the TVS is not funded or designed to smooth the path of supplier 
innovation, i.e., to provide any stimulus to support buyer appetite and uptake of 
supplier novel ideas, technologies and products; 
• That said, the TVS does help suppliers reduce their cost of product development, it 
enables the product to be trialled/tested in a live railway environment and provides a 
demonstration opportunity, albeit in all of these cases a small step of a much bigger and 
challenging journey. This scheme also helps build provenance for the final product or 
solution, which may encourage the buyer community to take more interest in novel 
solutions or at least to take it more seriously. 
Fifth, in support of the need for suppliers to be able to demonstrate the value of original 
thinking, technologies and products to an attentive buyer audience, the Rail Alliance 
developed low-cost access to national and international rail and engineering exhibitions, most 
notably Railtex/Infrarail and the Advanced Engineering Show in the UK and Innotrans in 
Berlin. This presents suppliers with an affordable opportunity to bring their products and 
capabilities into the rail buyer community spotlight, and share knowledge with other 
suppliers. 
The challenge with working with established events taking a more traditional approach to 
supporting the rail supply chain was that the number of suppliers the Rail Alliance can support 
is limited by the available exhibition space. To overcome this barrier, Rail Live was created. 
Rail Live is a Rail Alliance-owned and operated outdoor show for the benefit of suppliers (and 
buyers), creating powerful reasons for engagement and dialogue. In a few short years, Rail 
Live has grown to become the largest outdoor exhibition of innovative rail technologies, 
products and solutions in Europe. 
8.2.8 Rail Live Event Insight 
• With relatively few suppliers serving only the rail supply chain, support to enable supply 
chain diversity is key to encouraging and enabling GB rail sector innovation. From the 
feedback of many of the 350+ suppliers attending the Rail Live events, it is clear that 
suppliers often presented proof of better value against incumbent solutions or 
presented a new approach or product that would significantly and positively impact one 
of the key GB rail capability drivers, i.e., one or more of the four Cs (reduced cost and 
carbon or increased capacity or customer experience). The show gave them the 
opportunity to do this in a live rail environment; 
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• Though the facts speak for themselves, few original solutions capable of demonstrating 
an advantage to buyers will actually win work or orders. For the suppliers that do win 
work, it is often after complying with some extremely taxing product approval and 
procurement processes. 
Finally, again in partnership with the RSG and HS2, the Alliance ran a very successful series of 
best practice workshop events over the course of an 18 month period 
(www.rsgbestpractice.org and www.railalliance.co.uk/event/rsg-best-practice-workshop). 
These aimed to further develop the participants’ acumen levels in a specific range of activities 
such as Building Information Management and Lean tools, which were identified by the RSG 
(through the High Speed Rail workstream) as important subjects where it was felt that the 
buying community could learn from suppliers and vice versa. 
8.2.9 Best Practice Insight 
• The program was judged highly successful by its participants but did not really manage 
to engage with the breadth of audience it had hoped to. This was a good example of the 
lack of wide-scale buyer appetite to learn from the broader supply chain; 
• Again, it was a light-touch series of events that was limited in the capability and 
ultimately ambition by a combination of low levels of funding and commitment from 
the buying community. 
8.3 PHASE 2 – THE GENESIS OF FORMULA RAIL 
It is our experience at RA based on delivery of the TVS that despite the apparent efforts of the 
rail buying community and UK government, levels of uptake and adoption of original supplier 
products and solutions in the rail supply chain remains unacceptably low. 
Taking an independent view of some of the innovation initiatives (departmental, EU and 
private sector), many seemed to be over-simplified or naïve. Many demonstrated a poor 
understanding or appreciation that the outcomes were likely to offer no improvement to 
previous approaches. Many falsely raised suppliers’ expectations of a good outcome, i.e., a 
sale or at least a clear route to market. The whole innovation in rail piece has become too 
corporately egotistical and almost more for entertainment value than productivity, 
performance or profitability. The show on offer was a bad re-write of a bad re-write and 
tickets were not cheap. 
What the major buying community (inclusive of government departments and satellites) does 
not seem to comprehend is that being procured over the next few years begins its journey 
today with a responsibility extending decades. The whole rail economy machinery delivers 
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poor value for money to the UK as a whole and it delivers a poor-quality experience to both 
customers and the supply chain. 
Observations from the Rail Alliance’s unique and grassroots perspective of the landscape has 
revealed, with some degree of clarity, the key challenges facing GB rail and the conditions 
required to address them. The Rail Alliance came to the conclusion that an effective approach 
would be to complement and support the current TOP-DOWN approach with a new BOTTOM-
UP and CONDITIONS-BASED approach. 
BOTTOM-UP refers to a principle of ‘purpose and practice with policy’ for targeting and 
uniting individual buyer challenges and opportunities with qualified and highly enthusiastic 
suppliers. 
CONDITIONS-BASED refers to stimulation, development and nurturing of the CLIMATE and 
CONDITIONS necessary for encouraging and enabling suppliers to demonstrate and prove the 
net value (buyer and supplier risk vs. reward) of novel solutions and supporting a buyer’s 
business case to adopt them. 
8.3.1 Conditions as a Key Enabler 
We have identified four compound conditions that must be met to fuel the appetite and 
encourage the adoption of novel technologies, products and solutions within the GB rail 
sector. 
• Strength of supplier sector, buyer and product knowledge and acumen for stimulating 
and nurturing buyer appeal of novel rail solutions must be appropriate to a supplier’s 
customer profile, be demonstrable and current (ACUMEN); 
• Dialogue between unfamiliar suppliers and buyers must be contextual, timely, 
productive and outcome-oriented. Dialogue between a supplier and a buyer must be 
organic and demonstrate willingness and collaboration from both sides. Productive 
dialogue must therefore have a common value target (DIALOGUE); 
• A safe and open environment for enabling cooperative design of and support for novel, 
high-value solutions. Early cooperative design based on an expressive buyer target 
challenge, along with a clear target outcome is vital for constructing concepts capable 
of demonstrating better value or performance than established offerings and that are 
recognised by a buyer. A buyer convinced of an advantage is more likely to adapt its 
processes to accommodate it (DISCOVERY); 
• A transparent approach or methodology for protecting buyer/supplier interests and 
objectives, i.e., assessment of risk vs. benefits, presented by novel technologies and 
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products must be created and applied. Supplier and any original product or solution 
must present a provenance and proof (ADOPTION). 
Table 4 reviews a number of high profile government and industry initiatives for supporting 
innovation in rail. This simple assessment measures the extent to which each initiative 
satisfies each of the four conditions described above. This was followed by adding Rail Alliance 
initiatives. 
Table 4 –Sector Initiatives 
INITIATIVE TYPE: FUNDING INITIATIVE COVERAGE 
NETWORK RAIL HLOS DISCOVERY 
INNOVATION IN FRANCHISING DISCOVERY 
FINANCE BIRMINGHAM DISCOVERY 
NR STRATEGIC INNOVATION FUND DISCOVERY, ADOPTION 
INNOVATE UK COMPETITIONS DISCOVERY 
RSSB COMPETITIONS DISCOVERY 
NON-FUNDING  
 
SHARPCLOUD DISCOVERY 
BRIDGELIGHT DISCOVERY 
STRATEGIC UNIVERSITY PARTNERSHIPS ACUMEN 
PROJECT PIONEER ACUMEN, DIALOGUE, DISCOVERY, ADOPTION 
RAIL SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRATOR ACUMEN, DIALOGUE, DISCOVERY, ADOPTION 
UIS DISCOVERY, DIALOGUE, ADOPTION 
ICMM ACUMEN 
 
Observations 
A surprising number of initiatives concentrate on providing funds to support innovation. 
This directive presumes the existence of an innovation funding challenge or gap. However, 
reality (based on experience and observation) presents an alternative conclusion. 
Innovation dynamics are supplier push and buyer pull. We have already observed an 
imbalance, i.e., much more supplier push and very little buyer pull. Both are essential for 
innovation to work (in any sector and not exclusive to rail). So a simple question is ‘how would 
supplier funding for innovation (e.g., competitions/testing vouchers/rail growth fund) 
support the push and pull dynamic?’ and ‘how would buyer funding for innovation (e.g., IiF) 
support this push and pull dynamic?’ 
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8.3.2 SUPPLIER INNOVATION FUNDING 
More suppliers offering products and solutions performing better than conventional ones 
exist than the number of buyers demanding these offerings. Additional funding for suppliers 
via the mechanisms mentioned is unlikely to improve the situation for many suppliers. 
From a buyer perspective, more funding for suppliers may shine a temporary spotlight on 
responsive suppliers and their capabilities, although it would do little to increase the buyer 
pull. The scenario in which additional (more strategic) funding has the potential to stimulate 
buyer pull would be where a supplier invests in (i.e., self-funds) early support for the buyer 
challenge, objectives and or needs. In this situation, a supplier effectively performs the role 
of mentor or coach helping influence the buyer’s technology, product and procurement 
roadmaps (Parsloe & Leedham, 2009). Even though this is pre-contract and the traditional 
tendering process will need to be followed, at least the buyer will have a clear and evidenced 
(trusted) understanding of the value vs. risk position associated with accommodating the 
supplier’s novel approaches or products within an open bid. 
That said, the time, attention and resource required for developing supplier/buyer trust, plus 
the responsibility of managing this relationship would likely prove too much for most 
companies to bear. In a nutshell, supplier funding for innovation is unlikely to move the 
innovation needle for many or most suppliers. 
8.3.3 BUYER INNOVATION FUNDING 
Poor buyer pull is due to an actual plus perceived need for a buyer shift or evolution of their 
mind-set, behaviours, methods and processes. This is borne out by the evidence produced in 
the work published by LBG and the Manufacturing Technologies Association (MTA) in 
November 2016. The report shows quite clearly the difference between the SME’s appetite 
for innovation and its confidence in its business culture/risk-taking compared to the upper 
midsized company or corporate (LBG, 2016, p. 16). 
Although a significant shift is necessary, the reality is that a buyer is simply seeking the best 
results. If a supplier can demonstrate that they can help a buyer achieve this, then perhaps 
the biggest barrier has been removed. A buyer would have a good reason for at least exploring 
what it will take to accommodate a supplier’s novel ideas, methods or products. From our 
observations, the shift is much less onerous than it seems. 
From a buyer perspective, additional external funding for innovation is almost always after 
the fact (that is to say, the funding is disconnected with the organic flow of existing business) 
and by definition is likely to demonstrate limited connectivity with the buyer organisation’s 
strategic and operational space. 
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Any mechanism for increasing buyer pull (innovation investment included) must be easy, 
effective, economical and crucially rooted (or embedded after the fact) to a buyer’s core 
purpose, aims and objectives. Funding for innovation is no exception. Funding for innovation 
must be more than a pot of money with ambiguous, externally created governance strings 
attached. 
Embedding requires a welcome and prepared host. Creating a host is challenging for the 
reasons suggested earlier. 
The bottom line, for buyer external funding for innovation to work, is that the funding scheme 
must easily integrate within the fabric of a buyer’s organisation. To achieve this requires any 
funding scheme to comprise two parts: 
Buyer Funding Component – Part 1 INTEGRATOR 
This is, I believe, the (current) missing component. The integrator component is the 
investment delivery vehicle, which can be thought of as being the vehicle and the funding the 
passenger(s). This component will have been developed with a cooperative understanding of 
the dynamics and mechanics of a buyer organisation. The integrator component will respect 
and encourage the conditions essential for embedding the innovation funding within a buyer 
organisation. 
Buyer Funding Component - Part 2 THE FUNDING 
From a supplier point of view, additional buyer funding for innovation would achieve little 
beyond raising supplier hopes and expectations. This is because, in the current absence of 
Part 1 above, the typical buyer is poorly prepared for the full extent of activities associated 
with the support of external innovation; therefore, its adoption is highly unlikely to occur. For 
supplier innovation to work it requires the conditions for and the facilitation of it to be present 
in the buyer host and for there to be a strong connection with a buyer’s core business. Funding 
for innovation should recognise this and invest in programmes where buyers are selected that 
demonstrate such conditions (naturally occurring) or where these conditions are actively in 
process. 
Currently there is little evidence of the former and no examples of the latter. 
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 Figure 11 – Initiatives and Activities 
 
Other Observations 
From Error! Reference source not found.it can be see that, although this is an unsophisticated s
chematic, it does serve to highlight poor ‘Cumulative Competency’ within the Government & 
Industry initiatives and zone. 
Cumulative Competency can be expressed as the recyclable/reusable expertise, experience, 
know-how and relationships evolved from the delivery of many innovation initiatives. This 
should be a key consideration for government and industry, although with so many initiatives 
in play from widely differing sources, this will always prove difficult to achieve in practice. 
That said, there is nothing stopping the government, e.g., via RSG/RDG and enablers like 
InnovateUK/RSSB from creating a set of learnings based on previous and current innovation 
support initiatives irrespective of their origins. 
What this does highlight (diagram and reality) is, within the rail sector, the unique strength of 
the Rail Alliance’s cumulative competency. Whether by fortune or design, or both, this puts 
the Rail Alliance in a powerful position to evolve innovation initiatives bearing in mind 
learnings from previous activities. 
A more ambitious opportunity for the sector here would be for a body with the independence 
and credentials similar to those of the Rail Alliance to host the rail sector’s innovation 
initiatives knowledge base, incorporating its own learnings plus broader learnings from all rail 
10
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innovation initiatives. This also needs to be set in the constraints I believe exist for the UKRRIN 
hub aspirations which are covered later in the chapter. 
8.3.4 RAIL ALLIANCE INNOVATION PROGRAMME OPTIONEERING 
In response to this challenge the Rail Alliance looked at ways to exploit its ‘cumulative 
competency’ and began to explore and assess ways to stimulate and nurture the four 
conditions (ACUMEN, DIALOGUE, DISCOVERY and ADOPTION) essential to encouraging and 
enabling the uptake and embedding of innovation in rail. 
The options for each are assessed below in respect of the four conditions, and are discussed 
in terms of their pros and cons. 
ACUMEN 
Options for increasing levels of supplier and buyer ACUMEN. 
Here, acumen is defined as the practical demonstration of the supplier’s sector knowledge, 
of its buyer and product knowledge and capability to help stimulate and nurture buyer appeal 
for the supplier’s novel, ingenious or innovative solutions; concomitant with this is the buyer’s 
ability to proactively nurture high-trust supply chain relationships. 
OPTION 1  
Strengthen the Rail Alliance supplier networking events, adding a deeper and more contextual 
layer of knowledge captured from a wealth of activities with suppliers and buyers, and 
packaging and sharing this with suppliers and invited buyers to develop their individual and 
collective acumen. 
Table 5 – Acumen Option 1 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Networking events are well attended by a 
representative supplier and buyer community 
Current networking focus is intelligence 
associated with exploring known buyer 
opportunities 
There is high likelihood of supplier and buyer 
participation in knowledge capture/sharing 
The subject matter (sector, buyer opportunities, 
products) is dynamic and can evolve quickly, so 
keeping a fresh and relevant focus will present 
an ongoing challenge 
The Rail Alliance has a proven track record for 
developing basic levels of supplier/buyer 
acumen 
The setup of an appropriate acumen 
programme would require a significant 
investment to stimulate, capture and package 
knowledge and to promote, test and refine an 
acumen programme 
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An appropriate acumen programme would be 
difficult to scale and the Rail Alliance would 
struggle to maintain economically viability 
 
Conclusion 
The Rail Alliance supplier networking events foster appropriate, ‘light touch’ relationships for 
capturing and sharing knowledge valuable in the pursuit of supporting innovation in the rail 
sector; however, such events are unsuitable for scaling up either in terms of periodicity 
(resource limited) or size (beyond about 50 attendees they become more bland/opaque and 
much harder to focus). 
OPTION 2 
Deliver learning material through the Rail Alliance website. Content types would include 
video, audio, PowerPoint and webinars to develop and strengthen ACUMEN. 
 
Table 6 –Acumen Option 2 
Strengths Weaknesses 
There is a high likelihood of Rail Alliance 
member supplier participation 
Current networking focus is intelligence 
associated with exploring known buyer 
opportunities. Demographic of participants and 
their company roles may not lead to effective 
engagement 
The Rail Alliance has a proven track record for 
developing basic levels of supplier/buyer 
ACUMEN and using an online process would 
enable scalability 
The subject matter (sector, buyer opportunities 
and products) is dynamic and can evolve quickly, 
so keeping a fresh and relevant focus will 
present an ongoing challenge 
 
The setup of an appropriate ACUMEN 
programme would require a significant level of 
investment to stimulate, capture and package 
knowledge and to promote, test and refine 
 
Online delivery will be likely to generate lower 
level of supplier engagement 
 
Conclusion 
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Would tend to be complimentary not core to enabling innovation in the rail sector. The 
biggest drawback is that education/learning of this nature should be contextual and based on 
real (live where possible) examples. 
 
OPTION 3 
Presents an evolved supplier mentoring programme. Its aim is developing ACUMEN though 
the targeted exploration of buyer appetite and drivers, and supplier suitability to supply novel 
capabilities to address buyer medium- to longer-term needs. 
Table 7 –Acumen Option 3 
Strengths Weaknesses 
The current mentoring programme is credible. 
Designed and delivered by the Rail Alliance and 
sponsored by Government (BEIS) and sector 
(RSG) 
The intimate nature of mentoring makes it 
difficult to scale and currently has no clear 
business model outside RSG/BEIS financial 
support 
The current mentoring programme presents a 
ready-developed pool of engaged buyers and 
hungry suppliers 
Buyer drivers for this kind of prospective 
dialogue (no urgent and strong commercial 
reason nor commitment) of this nature are 
limited 
Topic of innovation within a complex rail 
environment is best suited to intimate dialogue 
 
Presents a good opportunity to stimulate, 
capture, share and test supplier acumen 
 
Presents supplier insight within a target buyer 
opportunity horizon (if one is available) 
 
Provides a unique insight into a buyer drives and 
competencies for adopting supplier novel 
solutions 
 
 
Conclusion 
Mentoring has proven its ability to deliver bespoke and high-quality levels of credibility in 
terms of supplier support for innovation, plus it puts enough pressure on the buyer 
community to at least discuss the viability of early and low-level opportunistic engagement. 
The down side of this engagement with the buyer is that for some it is led by a desire to be 
seen to be engaging and supporting the RSG as much as it is genuinely seeking solutions. It is 
clearly the case that this pressure really needs to come from within a buyer organisation for 
anything to really stick. Engagement through the mentoring programme should be presented, 
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and a strong case made, for buyers to be emotionally and intellectually attached to a roadmap 
for innovation. It should focus as much on the value of the journey rather than merely fulfilling 
mentoring programme key performance indicators. Mentoring also captures (with a little 
questioning and analysis) the nature of the gaps within a buyer organisation, for embracing 
innovation. 
 
OPTION 4 
The creation of a safe online environment for stimulating, capturing and sharing of knowledge 
centred on genuine buyer interests, objectives and/or opportunities. The development of 
buyer and supplier innovation ‘visual canvases’ provides a 360° expression of buyer interests 
and supplier capabilities, which in my team’s experience of other highly regulated and non-
regulated sectors/industries sectors such as construction and financial services is a necessity 
in order to gain an expansive and immersive view of the buyer/client challenge. 
Table 8 – Acumen Option 4 
Strengths Weaknesses 
The Rail Alliance is a strong candidate for hosting 
and facilitating this online environment due to 
its strong and appropriate ambition, expertise 
and reputation for independence 
The Rail Alliance has limited experience with 
these online collaboration environments 
Potential to encourage early and opportunistic 
engagement. This will generate immediate and 
ongoing intelligence (value) for a buyer due to 
the insights generated from challenge ‘canvas’ 
plus supplier contribution to discussions 
surrounding a challenge 
Requires significant investment to construct a 
bespoke online environment, and ensure 
sustainable longevity or proofing against 
obsolescence 
As supplier and buyer interaction is live and 
focused on a genuine buyer challenge, 
knowledge captured and disseminated is likely 
current 
Off-the-shelf solutions are feature-heavy and 
unfriendly in use 
From the points of view of suppliers and buyers, 
captured and shared knowledge is portable 
Relies on a high level of perceived and actual 
trust and integrity 
 
Conclusion 
An online environment, supported by offline activities has proved successful in non-rail 
sectors. If a suitable (accessible and stripped down to the base or built up from first principles, 
i.e., to encourage the four innovation conditions) environment was hosted and presented to 
Breaking down the Barriers – the Participation Puzzle Colin Flack 
Formula Rail – Challenge-Led, Performance-Driven 
 
 
89 
 
suppliers and buyers, then this could significantly support the conditions for developing and 
delivering supplier and buyer ACUMEN. Human control and facilitation is key. 
DIALOGUE 
Options for increasing levels of supplier and buyer DIALOGUE. 
The objective is to ensure that DIALOGUE between suppliers and buyers is timely, contextual, 
productive and results- and outcome-oriented. 
OPTION 1 
Place more focus on early, contextual and productive dialogue within the Rail Alliance’s 
supplier networking. 
Table 9 – Dialogue Option 1 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Networking events are well attended by a 
representative supplier and buyer community 
Networking events are unsuitable for 
encouraging intimate (sensitive) supplier 
dialogue between individual suppliers and 
buyers, beyond a basic recognition of a potential 
need of both communities 
There is high likelihood of supplier and buyer 
participation in basic early dialogue, assuming 
context and expectations are set appropriately 
 
The Rail Alliance has a proven track record for 
encouraging dialogue between suppliers and 
buyers 
 
 
Conclusion 
Supporting supplier/buyer dialogue is more suited as a two-stage process. Stage 1 involves 
supplier/buyer awareness of the potential for early, productive dialogue. This can be achieved 
at and during Rail Alliance networking events. Stage 2 is delivered in a more intimate 
environment. Stage 2 has strong synergies with the current mentoring programme. 
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OPTION 2 
Presents an evolved supplier mentoring programme. Its aim is to develop a secure 
relationship between a supplier and a buyer to encourage earlier, productive dialogue with 
respect to new and emerging opportunities, buyer ambitions or for suppliers to help inform 
buyer product and technology roadmaps. 
Table 10 – Dialogue Option 2 
Strengths Weaknesses 
The current mentoring programme is credible. 
Designed and delivered by the Rail Alliance and 
sponsored by Government (BEIS) and Sector 
(RSG) 
The intimate nature of mentoring makes it 
difficult to scale and has no clear business model 
outside RSG/BEIS financial support 
The current mentoring programme presents a 
ready-developed pool of engaged buyers and ‘fit 
for rail’ suppliers 
Buyer drivers for this kind of prospective 
dialogue (no urgent and strong commercial 
reason nor commitment) are limited 
The topic of innovation within a complex rail 
environment is best suited to intimate dialogue 
 
Presents supplier insight within a target buyer 
opportunity horizon (where available) 
 
Provides a unique insight into a buyer’s drivers 
and competencies for adopting supplier novel 
solutions 
 
 
Conclusion 
The mentoring programme could be an effective vehicle and channel for encouraging early, 
contextual dialogue between suppliers and buyers. Again, the responsibility for current low 
levels of DIALOGUE sits with supplier’s low levels of ACUMEN and with buyers it is a 
combination of low levels of interest, urgency and capacity for early, productive DIALOGUE. 
The mentoring programme could be recalibrated to begin to identify and evolve the 
commonalities rather than the differences. 
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OPTION 3 
The merits of a technology platform applying artificial intelligence and machine learning, to 
‘intelligently’ (deeply and contextually) match buyer needs. This would include short-, 
medium- and longer-term needs, i.e., challenges, opportunities and interests, with supplier 
expertise and ingenuity. 
Table 11– Dialogue Option 3 
Strengths Weaknesses 
In time, the platform would be capable of 
identifying and evidencing (to both 
communities) a strong context for dialogue 
between suppliers and buyers 
A supplier search interrogates (automatically) 
captured data. This data will lack nuanced 
meaning, which would be present if described 
by a human representative of the supplier 
organisation. This could tend to hide the true 
supplier capability when a candidate for a buyer 
match. This human expression is fundamental to 
developing a concept, design or solution that 
fully embraces the creative problem solving 
skills relevant to a buyer’s requirements 
Due to the nature of platform automation, the 
barriers to diverse supplier participation are low 
For most people, this platform presents an 
unnatural and uncertain environment, and does 
not encourage a response as a real-world 
meeting would. There is good reason for this. 
Accurate results will need many years-worth of 
data and a lot of supplier and buyer trust. 
Members of the rail buyer community that do 
use such a platform to inform them of candidate 
suppliers for early dialogue are unable to 
directly challenge the validity of search results 
Supplier representation of expertise, 
experience, ingenuity and capacity is 
automatically presented 
A platform of this kind would require a 
significant investment in terms of setup and 
operating costs until the results consistently 
present accurate matches 
A platform of this nature is scalable  
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Conclusion 
An artificial intelligence technology/platform will require considerable investment and proof 
before it can create enough value for suppliers and buyers. This is a chicken and egg scenario, 
as it will require lots of real data (from supplier and buyer activities) to prove itself. Human 
control and facilitation is key. 
 
OPTION 4 
A safe online environment for stimulating, capturing and sharing of knowledge centred on 
genuine buyer interests, objectives and/or opportunities. Applying buyer and supplier 
innovation ‘visual canvases’ for providing 360° expression of buyer interests plus supplier 
capabilities. 
Table 12 – Dialogue Option 4 
Strengths Weaknesses 
The Rail Alliance is a strong candidate for hosting 
and facilitating this online environment due to 
its strong and appropriate ambition, expertise 
and reputation for independence 
The Rail Alliance has limited experience with 
these online collaboration environments 
Potential to encourage early and opportunistic 
engagement, as it will generate immediate and 
ongoing intelligence (value) for a buyer due to 
the insights generated from challenge ‘canvas’ 
plus supplier contribution to discussions 
surrounding a challenge 
Requires significant investment to construct 
bespoke online environment 
Supplier and buyer dialogue is live and focused 
on a genuine buyer challenge 
Off-the-shelf solutions tend to be feature-heavy 
and unfriendly in use 
 
Conclusion 
An online environment, such as the one proposed here provides excellent context for supplier 
and buyer dialogue. For instance, a buyer challenge canvas has the potential to present a very 
high volume of supplier points of interest. This interest is easily converted into productive 
dialogue through supplier questions and buyer answers to these questions. 
 
DISCOVERY 
Options for supporting the DISCOVERY of better performing solutions. 
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A safe and open environment for encouraging and enabling cooperative design of and support 
for high-value concepts representing novel methods, technologies, products or solutions. 
OPTION 1 
This presents an evolved supplier mentoring programme. Its aim is to encourage the 
development of multi-layered and multi-dimensional relationships between suppliers and 
buyers. This will aim to encourage the discovery of novel methods, technologies, products or 
solutions that demonstrate the potential to deliver better performance than existing 
offerings. 
Table 131 – Discovery Option 1 
Strengths Weaknesses 
The current mentoring programme presents a 
ready-developed pool of engaged buyers and 
suppliers 
A core aim of the relatively embryonic 
mentoring programme is to facilitate early and 
productive dialogue. Relationships between 
suppliers and buyers working in the mentoring 
programme are immature. This makes it 
challenging for buyers to support transparent, 
open and cooperative exploration of 
appropriate novel concepts 
Provides a unique insight into a buyer’s drivers 
and competencies valuable for supporting the 
discovery of supplier novel solutions 
The intimacy of the mentoring environment 
does not support creative input from a broad 
and diverse supplier community 
 
Conclusion 
Mentoring seems to be less suited for the concept of DISCOVERY, and more suited to 
exploring and developing established or conventional relationships. Mentoring may therefore 
offer value to suppliers and buyers post-concept DISCOVERY, where a buyer is interested in 
exploring a specific concept. That said, the mentoring programme would supply valuable 
supplier and (especially) buyer insights that would support DISCOVERY. 
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OPTION 2 
A safe and collaborative online environment for suppliers and buyers to discover better ways 
to address genuine buyer interests, objectives or opportunities (needs), applying buyer and 
supplier innovation ‘visual canvases’ for providing 360° expression of buyer interests plus 
supplier capabilities. 
Table 14 – Discovery Option 2 
Strengths Weaknesses 
A visually expressive challenge canvas will 
encourage supplier ingenuity and help trigger 
the discovery of new connections and ideas to 
address the buyer objectives at the core of the 
challenge 
Management, governance and administration of 
an appropriate collaboration environment 
would require effective and bespoke processes 
and methods 
Such a scalable environment will permit and 
manage the contribution from multiple 
suppliers from a diverse spectrum of expertise, 
experience and sectors 
The Rail Alliance has limited experience with 
online collaboration environments 
The digital nature of the platform will present a 
comprehensive audit of supplier and buyer 
activities, valuable in encouraging trust and 
transparency through automatic recording of 
the origins of new ideas (i.e., foreground IP 
developed through collaboration) 
Requires significant investment to construct a 
bespoke online environment 
 Off-the-shelf solutions tend to be feature-heavy 
and unfriendly in use 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
An online environment capable of nurturing the required conditions for innovation presents 
a significant opportunity for suppliers, buyers and government. Most of the ingredients 
required already exist in some shape or form and the challenge is therefore to identify and 
Breaking down the Barriers – the Participation Puzzle Colin Flack 
Formula Rail – Challenge-Led, Performance-Driven 
 
 
95 
 
bring together the most suitable components. They in turn then need to be imbued with 
effective practices, processes and governance to make it all work. A greater challenge is to 
ensure the environment maintains a positive and dynamic flow of information between users 
so as to deliver value (new insights through to new solutions) to suppliers and buyers 
throughout the development experience. 
ADOPTION 
A credible approach or methodology for protecting buyer/supplier interests and objectives, 
i.e., assessment of risk versus benefits, presented by novel technologies and products must 
be created and applied. This is to encourage positive engagement leading to ADOPTION. 
OPTION 1 
Suppliers (indirectly buyers) receive little support that encourages the ADOPTION of novel 
solutions. Beyond innovation funding or financing, the testing vouchers scheme stands alone 
in this regard. ADOPTION of novel solutions by the rail supply chain demands an immediate 
high level of certainty associated with performance and risk. 
For the suppliers and their novel solutions, the path to ADOPTION can be extremely 
challenging. The three innovation conditions, ACUMEN, DIALOGUE and DISCOVERY, all play a 
vital part supporting and accelerating the ADOPTION of novel solutions. 
Certainty is derived from assurance, which in turn is derived from a buyer’s knowledge and 
acceptance of all plausible outcomes presented by a solution as a response to a buyer 
challenge. 
ADOPTION is helped by identifying all plausible outcomes and, for each outcome, 
demonstrating a clear rationale that supports that outcome. 
There currently exist no alternative methods within the sector to encourage the adoption of 
novel solutions versus traditional manual methods of product development. 
 
OPTION 2 
A cooperative agreement and partnership between various organisations supportive of the 
ADOPTION of novel solutions. During the development lifecycle of a novel solution, this 
development community would be encouraged to maintain solution data consistency, 
enabling a faster development cycle and delivering outputs more supportive of buyer 
assurance, certainty and ADOPTION. 
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Table 15 – Adoption Option 2 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Faster development path for novel supplier 
solutions 
Requires considerable investment to develop a 
partnership representative of the capabilities 
required by a diverse range of supplier solutions 
and buyer requirements 
Presents earlier, accurate data for supporting 
buyer decision-making and adoption  
Requires genuine buyer interest in supplier 
novel solutions 
Opportunity to present cost transparency to 
suppliers and buyers 
 
Presents a supplier and a buyer with solution 
provenance 
 
 
Conclusion 
The immediate and fundamental barrier to innovation in the rail sector is genuine buyer 
interest in supplier novel solutions. Developing a smart development community for targeting 
supplier novel solutions is of no value if little or no buyer interest in supplier novel solutions 
exists. 
Fostering a smart development community based on a strong pipeline of interest in supplier 
novel solution is a stronger option. 
OPTION 3 
A safe and collaborative online environment for supporting buyer adoption of novel and 
better performing solutions. 
Table 16 – Adoption Option 3 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Encourages early and productive dialogue 
between a supplier and buyer for generating 
genuine, contextual and informed buyer interest  
Requires a trusted and competent entity to 
facilitate 
Environment able to facilitate the exploration 
and supporting rationale of plausible outcomes 
associated with a novel solution 
Requires significant investment to construct 
bespoke solution 
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Environment able to facilitate and respond to 
the contribution from a large community of 
suppliers  
Off-the-shelf solutions tend to be feature-heavy 
and unfriendly in use 
Environment able to facilitate various ‘what if’ 
scenarios 
 
 
Conclusion 
A collaborative online environment offers the potential for real advancement for the 
ADOPTION of supplier novel solutions within the rail supply chain. It provides a safe and 
secure space for encouraging open discussion and gathering enough evidence to provoke 
increased levels of interest and commitment from a buyer. 
The challenges that need to be overcome centre on the platform itself, the significant cost to 
create a platform. We do not believe that existing platforms accommodate all of the features 
required to nurture the conditions for innovation.  
 
8.4 PHASE 3 – FORMULA RAIL 
Formula Rail is the result of a decade of observation and action in an attempt to support the 
greater diversity of the rail supply chain, facilitated by encouraging the four innovation 
conditions: 
 
Figure 11 – Formula Rail Innovation Conditions 
8.4.1 REASONING AND RATIONALE 
Error! Reference source not found. illustrates Formula Rail’s potential to satisfy these four i
nnovation conditions. 
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8.4.2 KEY OBJECTIVE 
In early 2015 the Rail Alliance began to explore the options for defining a GB rail innovation 
platform and environment based on its substantial experience leading various innovation 
initiatives such as SMCF, TVS and ERDF/ESIF. 
The proposed rail innovation platform and environment (Formula Rail) was formed by 
combining key Rail Alliance capabilities from the networking and mentoring programmes and 
supplemented these with two third-party technology platforms and services. 
8.4.3 FORMULA RAIL POSITIONING 
Formula Rail programmes encourage and focus supplier ingenuity to build and prove original, 
high-value concepts capable of addressing significant buyer problems or challenges. 
Key Features of the Formula Rail platform and environment: 
• A safe environment for suppliers and buyers to pursue original and better-value options 
to address a buyer problem or challenge; 
• A challenge canvas giving a supplier an expressive, knowledge-rich, 360° interactive 
preview of a buyer problem or challenge; 
• A powerful Q&A engine for enabling suppliers to discover the smallest detail of the 
buyer problem or challenge; 
• A proprietary innovation methodology helps stimulate deeper and more targeted levels 
of supplier ingenuity and creativity; 
• A private online supplier innovation canvas for capturing and sharing individual supplier 
thoughts, ideas, designs and proposals; 
• A platform-embedded user activity audit to ensure original supplier and buyer ideas are 
credited to their creator; 
• Formula Rail Member and Assured accreditation proves supplier ingenuity and 
collaboration based on actual contribution during buyer challenges; 
• The world’s largest innovation marketing platform for promoting supplier ideas 
developed on the Formula Rail platform to thousands of buyers in rail and other sectors. 
A Formula Rail programme promotes early, productive supplier and buyer dialogue 
encouraging development of novel ideas with potential to out-perform incumbent solutions. 
In terms of its positioning, the Formula Rail programme sits between feasibility and detailed 
design stages within a typical rail development process, e.g., the NR Governance for Railway 
Investment Projects process. 
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This positioning provides the following advantages over existing innovation development 
environments and processes: 
• The Formula Rail platform supports a large volume (typically 30–50) of suppliers 
participating in a challenge; 
• The staged Formula Rail innovation process encourages individual suppliers to team up 
with other compatible suppliers to form concept development groups; 
• The Formula Rail challenge canvas is capable of expressing buyer needs as well as buyer 
aspirations; 
• Supplier Q&A based on the buyer challenge canvas helps supplier define the boundaries 
or limits of a buyer’s appetite for innovation; 
• The Formula Rail programme methodology challenges suppliers to continually evolve 
their thinking and ideas and focus on the underlying rationale. 
8.4.4 FORMULA RAIL PLATFORM 
Based on an analysis of options, it was clear that the online environment presented the most 
effective choice for supporting innovation in the rail supply chain. It was considered that the 
high cost and significant levels of expertise required to develop a platform capable of 
delivering the conditions for innovation was a challenge that could be addressed. 
The route taken was to develop strategic development partnerships with two existing 
innovation platforms, where the Rail Alliance would provide the sector intelligence and 
expertise and in return the chosen platform owners would apply this intelligence and 
expertise to create a solution that could, in principle, stimulate the transformation of the 
performance of the rail sector. 
Two third-party services were selected based on their ability to deliver the conditions 
required to encourage and enable innovation in the rail sector (described above), plus the 
following additional criteria: 
• IMPACT – a platform and environment that is capable of nurturing the conditions 
essential to innovation. ACUMEN, DIALOGUE, DISCOVERY and ADOPTION; 
• EXPERIENCE – a platform and environment created with the user in mind. A platform 
that presents a supplier, buyer and facilitator with a low level of user friction when using 
the platform. In simple terms, quite straightforward to use; 
• SCALABILITY – a platform and environment that is able to quickly accommodate a 
practically unlimited volume of users whilst retaining an optimum user experience; 
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• SUPPORT – an organisation, platform and environment responsive to the needs of users 
and the Rail Alliance; 
• ECONOMICS – an organisation offering a flexible business model, reflective of the early 
and exploratory stage of market penetration. 
8.4.5 ONLINE INNOVATION PLATFORM 
PlayTank™ (www.playtank.net) is a ‘next generation’ innovation management platform, 
founded in 2016 by Toby Farren with the goal of enabling large organisations to innovate at 
scale and effectively engage with their teams as well as external stakeholders. 
In 2016, the Rail Alliance formed a strategic partnership with PlayTank™, and since then has 
developed a bespoke version of the core PlayTank™ platform to present a simple yet powerful 
innovation capability for rail sector buyers and suppliers. The ability to tailor an existing 
platform overcomes the reservations expressed above regarding the shortcomings of ‘off-
the-shelf solutions tending to be feature-heavy and unfriendly in use’ and minimises the cost 
of starting from scratch. 
PlayTank™ delivers two environments. 
 
Figure 13 – PlayTank™ Key Components 
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The first is the client challenge canvas: 
 
Figure 14 – PlayTank™ Client Challenge Canvas 
In stage one of a Formula Rail programme, the challenge canvas is where suppliers develop 
their understanding of a buyer challenge through a comprehensive Q&A session. In stage 
three a variation of the challenge canvas is used to develop new concepts in response to a 
buyer challenge. 
The second environment is the ingenuity or supplier canvas: 
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Figure 15 – PlayTank™ Supplier Innovation Canvas 
This is a private, secure online space where a supplier is able to capture and share thoughts, 
ideas, designs and proposals that can be deployed during a buyer challenge. 
8.4.6 ONLINE INNOVATION MARKETPLACE 
The second third-party service is Leading Edge Only (LEO™; 
https://www.leadingedgeonly.com/innovation-marketplace/communities). LEO™ is the 
largest global online marketplace for innovative materials, technologies, products and 
services. LEO™ provides innovative companies with a channel to showcase their solution 
appropriate to their target market, promoting their innovation to the FTSE 100, the Fortune 
1000, business partners, investors and other organisations across the globe. 
In 2016 the Rail Alliance formed a strategic partnership with LEO™, and since then has 
developed a bespoke and exclusive rail channel within the LEO™ platform. 
This presents a unique shop window for supplier concepts developed within the Formula Rail 
platform and environment. 
The strategic partnerships with Rail Alliance, LEO™ and PlayTank™ provide a complete rail 
innovation ecosystem for suppliers keen to explore the opportunities within the rail sector 
and for buyers to work alongside innovative suppliers to identify existing better performing 
solutions or to encourage the creation of new ones. 
8.4.7 ANALYTICS 
The core Formula Rail platform (PlayTank™) presents valuable user analytics. 
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The data captured can express the following type of indicators: 
• Supplier/buyer participation in terms of their contribution to a challenge; 
• Supplier/buyer collaboration with a buyer, other participating suppliers; 
• Supplier/buyer response to a question, task or challenge; 
• Supplier/buyer ingenuity/originality in terms of their contribution to a challenge. 
We are confident that the data available through the PlayTank™ platform will permit us to 
create meaningful and accurate measures that represent and express the indicators above. 
Perhaps for the first time (admittedly in a managed environment), the platform will capture 
real innovation and ingenuity. 
 
Figure 12 – Formula Rail Performance Measures 
Collaboration has been a dynamic label for team performance for many years and its value a 
key aspect of the work of the McNulty study teams, especially in relation to devolved decision-
making (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 47). Yet there remains no meaningful common or agreed 
measure of collaboration, in the same way that the Innovation Capability Maturity Model 
(ICMM) achieves for innovation. This is a significant inhibitor. 
There are models that could be adopted such as the Lockheed Martin Skunkworks approach 
which typically now refers to the creation of a semi-secret (technology) collaboration space. 
Acting on the recommendations of the Hauser Report the UK Government enabled the 
creation of a series of Catapult centres across a wide range of technologies; their aim is in 
part to produce collaboration space for both consortia and individual bodies through access 
to expert impartial, business focussed, advice and technology. The Catapults with a few 
exceptions have an uncertain future though as they have failed to meet their funding targets 
and still rely on public subsidy. The BEIS sponsored review of their outputs conducted in 
Breaking down the Barriers – the Participation Puzzle Colin Flack 
Formula Rail – Challenge-Led, Performance-Driven 
 
 
104 
 
November 2017 (Ernst & Young, 2017) found that the Transport System Catapult along with 
Digital and Future Cities need remedial plans and are subsequently in danger of losing their 
funding. There have been attempts within the sector through RSSB competitions such as their 
Train Operator Competition(s) where they have attempted to create consortia bids based 
around collaboration but led by a TOC. These competitions have a somewhat mixed record of 
success and have been very slow to get to the delivery stage. The RIA UIS, again sponsored 
and funded by RSSB created a new space for a while, levering RIA’s top tier members to 
bolster a simple model of getting a wide range of people, from companies large and small into 
the same room, with a common goal of collaboration. It has failed to evolve though beyond 
its original form and has ceased beyond the original funded period. 
 
8.4.8 HUMAN FACTORS 
It became clear that although technology plays an important part of the preferred option, it 
is people that bring together the necessary components to create an organism rather than a 
machine. 
One of the components required for innovation is the appropriate mind-set. A preferred 
innovation mind-set was explored in depth, and its principles are embedded within the 
Formula Rail programme facilitation, methods and governance. 
8.4.9 FORMULA RAIL INTERFACING WITH GB RAIL 
The Formula Rail platform and environment is built to accommodate any sector/buyer 
challenge whilst addressing some of the key barriers to innovation in GB rail. 
It should be noted that Formula Rail is not a grandiose, top-down scheme built to solve the 
sector’s ills, but simply an attempt to create a safe space where innovation in rail works. These 
Formula Rail facilitated innovation spaces evolve, expand and contract to fit the size, nature 
and timing of a challenge. It is an incubator and accelerator all rolled into one: 
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Figure 17 – Formula Rail Positioning 
Importantly, Formula Rail is a vehicle that welcomes any and all organisations with a genuine 
interest in innovation. It is designed specifically to meet the challenge of being inclusive not 
exclusive. 
 
Figure 18 – Formula Rail Optioneering 
Where Formula Rail can support the broader innovation agenda and challenges facing GB rail 
is through the production of genuine innovation experiences that demonstrate to suppliers 
and buyers what innovation in rail looks and feels like. 
The Formula Rail platform and environment as described above can transform clever thinking 
into clever practical value. One example is the rail sector ICMM. 
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ICMM is an innovation capability assessment that targets supplier and buyer communities. Its 
aim is to create a greater understanding of innovation in the rail sector, what it looks like, 
what it can mean to an organisation and what an organisation needs to do to increase their 
levels of innovation. This a fundamental outcome of the McNulty review, which recognised 
that GB was underperforming in terms of innovation maturity against our international peers 
(DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 59). The aim is therefore to be able to measure performance at 
appropriate intervals and from that seek improvement. 
ICMM assessment is broken down into six themes: Competitive Environment, Strategic 
Alignment, Internal Innovation Activities, External Innovation Activities, Organisation and 
Culture. 
Currently, although the value of ICMM is clear to see, few suppliers are interested. The reason 
for most is that ICMM seems too much of an academic exercise, offering no immediate value 
and, it can be argued, which requires significant investment from a supplier in time and 
resource to make changes to improve their innovation capability. 
These suppliers are more often than not entrepreneurs and innovators. Their innovation-
speak is different from the innovation-speak of ICMM. 
Where Formula Rail can help is by mapping a supplier ICMM assessment and its 
recommendations onto activities undertaken by a supplier during their participation in a 
Formula Rail challenge. 
A supplier can then see for themselves the behaviours and activities that correspond to their 
particular needs contained within their ICMM improvement plan and embed the better 
practices within their ongoing activities within or outside Formula Rail. 
8.4.10 ASSURANCE 
The Rail Alliance is exploring strategic partnerships that can leverage the expertise and 
reputation of GB rail assurance and accreditation organisations, within the Formula Rail 
platform and environment. These include Achilles and the NR certification body. 
In parallel to this, we propose the Formula Rail independent accreditation, ‘Formula Rail 
Assured’. 
Suppliers participating in a Formula Rail challenge are assessed in terms of their technical, 
creative problem solving and collaboration skills and expertise. This assessment comprises a 
pre-challenge capability screening capturing evidence of supplier expertise and experience 
that can demonstrate some affinity and relevance to a specific challenge. The second 
component of a supplier assessment involves measurement of supplier contribution during a 
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challenge. This is made possible by the unique nature of the Formula Rail challenge 
environment, the novel innovation framework applied and the Rail Alliance’s expert 
facilitation. 
Suppliers participating in a challenge receive continuous constructive feedback. This feedback 
is a response to supplier contribution of technical, creative problem solving and collaboration 
with other challenge participants and stakeholders. 
In recognition of this, Formula Rail incorporates a simple reward scheme. 
Suppliers that undertake a Formula Rail assessment and/or participate in a challenge receive 
the ‘Formula Rail Community Member’ accreditation, in recognition of possessing the skills 
and mind-set core to the design of better performing solutions for the rail supply chain. 
Suppliers that participate in a challenge and consistently demonstrate a strong innovation 
dynamic (measured via the platform) will be rewarded with the ‘Formula Rail Community 
Assured’ accreditation. A strong innovation dynamic is represented by a combination of 
supplier strategic outlook, critical thinking, problem solving and collaboration with other 
challenge stakeholders. 
 
Figure 19 – Formula Rail – Fuelling Innovation 
8.5 Overall Conclusions 
It would seem clear that for the sector to flourish and to both improve its productivity and 
value for money, a step change in approach is needed. Despite the very high levels of routine 
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spending in the sector and in innovation this has not happened. That 20 years after 
privatisation and 5 years after McNulty both the TLG and ILG along with the RDG and RSG are 
still grappling with basic issues is further evidence of a lack of progress. In my opinion the 
combination of the development of the UKRRIN proposal and the uptake of Formula Rail has 
the ability to change this situation. The former will provide a sound platform to develop from 
and the latter the necessary mind-set change. 
The two are linked but not interdependent. The governance structures that guide the UKRRIN 
will need to ensure that it does not become mired in either the potential rivalry between the 
primary collaborators or a hostage to the same failings that have dogged the sector since 
privatisation. It must avoid any pretension that it is the only source of innovation advice and 
assistance or that it is the only source of knowledge (acumen). 
In parallel and aligned with UKRRIN, Formula Rail aims to establish a virtual and physical 
presence; such an entity must be characterised by an ability to receive, refine and rebroadcast 
challenge statements in a manner that engages the wider supply chain to the benefit of the 
sector and the nation. It will provide a neutral space, devoid of conflicts of interest akin to the 
highly acclaimed and successful Lockheed Martin Skunkworks programme. Crucially in such a 
highly disaggregated industrial sector, it will provide the much-needed coherence and system 
integration that has been lost since privatisation. When judged against the prerequisites that 
were so important to the McNulty review the case for a combination of Formula Rail and 
UKRRIN, when compared to the current situations looks like this: 
 
Table 17 – Progress against McNulty Review Prerequisites 
McNulty “important prerequisites” Present 
today? 
Formula 
Rail 
UKRRIN 
Good leadership from the top N Y Y 
Clear objectives and the right values N Y ? 
Good quality, devolved financial information N ? ? 
Culture where the status quo and previous 
assumptions are continually challenged 
N Y Y 
An organisation structure that fosters well-motivated 
management teams, organisational alignment and 
effort and the right speed of action 
N Y Y 
Incentives and contractual mechanisms that encourage 
cost reduction 
? Y Y 
Implementation and focus at every level N Y ? 
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Effective communications Y Y ? 
A focus on detail and making change happen  ? Y Y 
Consistency of purpose over long periods ? Y Y 
Y = yes; N = no data or too early to conclude; ? = debatable/not yet (DfT/ORR, 2011a, p. 35) 
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9 Findings and Recommendations 
Through the research undertaken for this study, I have found that my hypothesis is correct 
and that the systemic fault lines that run through the sector can be traced to the unintended 
consequences of privatisation. I have not set out to analyse the rights or wrongs of the act of 
privatising the railway and thus am neutral on the subject. What is clear though is that the 
fundamental, dogmatic beliefs that triggered the Act were hopelessly flawed and the 
consequences are as apparent and damaging today as they were in 1993. 
Conversely the hypothesis of the McNulty review is only partially true and that the 
overarching issue is the failure of the Tier 1/OEMs, better described as the major buyers, to 
recognise, encourage, nurture and embed the notion of continuous product development and 
innovation truly into all strata of their businesses. This failure has then led to the situation 
where all that is new is treated as being inherently innovative and thus presumed to be 
carrying high levels of uncertainty and risk. 
The adoption of new technology is therefore relatively rare and piecemeal. The almost 
universal approach within the sector is to create ‘innovation stovepipes’ or ‘silos’ which 
distances anything new from business as usual (where both continuous improvement and 
innovation needs to be to become reality). Innovation has become a sullied, almost 
meaningless, word that is deployed to create an illusion of purpose when in fact it is all too 
often just a cynical ill-focused distraction. Crucially it is also very rare for the Tier 1/OEM 
community to give any financial assistance or any real support to such R&D. The culture within 
the sector is not one that really recognises and nurtures meaningful collaboration; in fact, 
“the business drivers in the GB rail industry continue to be defined in ways that are 
contradictory to collaborative innovation” (Atkins, 2011, p. 35). 
The Rail Value for Money Study’s contention that a lack of affordable and readily available 
test and development facilities is a major barrier for SMEs to entering the rail sector is but 
one facet of this overall approach to innovation in the rail sector. In fact it hid the fact that 
this seminal study failed to address the failings of the supply chain and instead made 
assumptions that its needs and wants were being met by existing agencies such as trade 
associations. If their suppositions were valid, then so many years later, there would not have 
been any need for the formation of the RSG and the subsequent development of a sector 
wide Industrial Strategy/Sector Deal. 
Ultimately there is a failure by government at departmental level and in the higher echelons 
of the railway supply chain to get to grips with the fact that the lack of a coherent route map 
for suppliers into the sector for even the most basic of business as usual product, goods or 
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service means that anything deemed innovative has little or no chance of surviving or even 
finding the route to market. This failing is driven by poor leadership, supply chain 
understanding and unresolved fragmentation. 
Outside of specific stovepipes/silos the industry’s actual indifference to and suspicion of any 
kind of innovation is degrading the indigenous supplier base. The ability to develop business 
cases for novel and novative products, goods and services to the point where they can gain 
product acceptance and approval and, hence, be adopted and purchased/procured by the 
major buyers, is severely limited. 
If successful, the twin-pronged approach by the newly formed TLG and ILG has a chance of 
making a significant impact; however, recent history suggests this is by no means certain. 
Whether this will have any meaningful impact at Tier 2 and below within the broader supply 
chain remains severely in doubt. As demonstrated by the BEIS Select Committee report, the 
system remains loaded in favour of big business. 
My work has been based on direct experience, case studies and interviews that are 
representative of the broader picture and illustrate the current problems, whilst also 
informing and encouraging a wider debate. My research leads me to make a strong case in 
support of the hypothesis but within the significant constraint that it is the failure to both 
create/map a coherent route to market and to embed innovation within business as usual 
that goes to the heart of the issue. The sector is a complicit prisoner of its own past and, to 
an extent, its own making. Although this is a reflection of human nature, this sector can do so 
much better and needs to create a map of its own to take forward. It does not have to accept 
the status quo, whether political, departmental or regulatory. 
In turn, the real challenge is that the sector is so disjointed and disorganised that when it 
comes to product development there is in fact no such thing as a ‘route to market’ that has 
any form of universal application or coherence. The existing major suppliers/buyers within 
the sector have become very adept at creating an illusion of openness, unwittingly fed by the 
likes of the Enabling Innovation/Future Railway teams when in fact much of what they actually 
do, whether intended or not, is defend their own market position back in their national or 
home markets. 
I also agree with previous commentators that there is a need for the development of a new, 
enhanced and empathetic understanding within the major supplier/buyer community of the 
needs, wants and capabilities of the indigenous GB supplier base; essentially, a major shift in 
culture and behaviour is required to develop an ecosystem fit for the challenges of the 21st 
century. 
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I have confirmed that the main challenge to doing business in the rail sector stems from the 
fragmentation fault line that was created at privatisation and has not been healed since. 
I have identified that the main barriers that hinder and in some cases prevent SMEs and in 
particular mid-market companies entering the rail sector are the combination of a lack of 
coherence in the route to market and the default setting of the industry to exclude. I have 
analysed the underlying causes and issues; 
I have established the validity of the findings of the McNulty study team in relation to supply 
chain development (or lack thereof) and analysed the underlying and background issues 
which appear to have frozen this work. 
• In doing so, I have established the broad validity of the argument that there is a 
relationship between the incoherent adoption of elements of the McNulty review 
recommendations and the poor state of supply chain maturity and performance. This 
in turn has led to a confused and ineffective approach to innovation; 
• In my view, the barrier created by the paucity of appropriate testing and trialling 
facilities is a symptom of a broader problem that could be addressed by the adoption 
of a proactive, clustering based incubator model as an integral part of the development 
of the UKRRIN bid when successful. The relationship between innovation and that which 
is merely an integral part of continuous improvement and in the rail sector has to be 
addressed and innovation needs to become the competitive edge of business as usual; 
• The sector has become too dependent on following the patterns set by an oligopoly 
market but has the ability to challenge and change this model. To do so it will, however, 
have to adopt a different mind-set and create new more collaborative ecosystems. It 
lacks leadership of the quality and gravitas it deserves, a constantly recurring theme 
over the past 20 years. It is a sector that has forgotten its entrepreneurial roots and has 
become obsessed with management and procedure. It fails to inspire! 
• There is a clear obsession with innovation as a panacea for all evils. It has become a 
much over-used word to the point that I would maintain it has become a lazy way of 
attempting to solve systemic underlying issues in the sector. Where it or, more 
precisely, ingenuity is required there is very little genuine support that will enable it to 
find a route to market; 
• I have established suggestions for best practice in developing the capability of SMEs 
through the creation of a synthetic environment in the form of the Formula Rail 
approach to challenge-focused solutioneering in combination with the anticipated 
outputs of the UKRRIN. 
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Through my research I have also identified market failures and pinch points on the route to 
market in sufficient detail to enable further research to take place. I propose the 
establishment of a virtual and physical network of excellence and, in my conclusions, I would 
maintain that such an entity must be characterised by an ability to receive, refine and 
rebroadcast challenge statements in a manner that engages the wider supply chain to the 
benefit of the sector and the nation. It will provide a neutral space, devoid of conflicts of 
interest (commercial, academic or political) akin to the highly acclaimed and successful 
Lockheed Martin Skunkworks program. Crucially in such a highly disaggregated industrial 
sector, it will provide the much-needed coherence and system integration that has been lost 
since privatisation. I also have also set out the supporting philosophies and strategies that 
may be integral to its creation through the adoption of a Formula Rail type of approach to 
overcome the systemic deficiencies of the sector. 
It is my recommendation that further work be completed to align the rail sector such that the 
inherent structural weaknesses can be overcome through the application of forward looking 
approaches such as that afforded by UKRRIN and Formula Rail. An important consideration in 
the process is the re-assessment of the background political imperatives behind the 
privatisation of the sector and a reduction of the inherently flawed tactical activities of 
Ministers and their Departments and clarification of their overarching strategic role.  
To meet its true potential the modern rail sector should enjoy the same level of self-deter-
mination as Aviation, Highways and the Automotive Industry. 
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